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TOBACCO CONTROL STRATEGIES: PAST
EFFICACY AND FUTURE PROMISE
Robert L. Rabin*
The period of greatest turbulence in the world of tobacco control
appears to have passed. Roiled by massive disclosures of deceptive
practices in internal documents, the major tobacco producers came to
be seen as a rogue industry in the mid-1990s.' By the turn of the new
century, political support, particularly in Congress, that had stayed
the hand of any significant federal regulatory control was nowhere in
evidence. Yet, only a few years later, as legislation that would
subject the industry to federal regulatory scrutiny for the first time
remains in limbo, tobacco seems to have-at least for the moment-
virtually disappeared from the radar screen; obesity and
pharmaceutical-related harms now dominate the agenda of current
public health concerns.'
. A. Calder Mackay Professor of Law, Stanford Law School. Many thanks to Dave
Altman, Peter Schuck, and Steve Sugarman for helpful comments on an earlier draft, and to
Shruti Raju for valuable research assistance. I recently served on the Institute of Medicine's
Committee on Reducing Tobacco Use, which prepared, ENDING THE TOBACCO PROBLEM: A
BLUEPRINT FOR THE NATION (2007). The findings in that report were of great value to me in
writing this Article, but the views expressed here are my own.
1. This perception served as a capstone for public health concerns about the link between
smoking and lung cancer that had begun to crystallize as early as the mid-1950s. See ALLAN
BRANDT, THE CIGARETTE CENTURY 357-58 (2007).
2. Under the current bill before Congress, introduced on February 15, 2007, the Food and
Drug Administration ("FDA") would be given plenary authority over the tobacco industry. On
October 3, 2007, FDA Commissioner Andrew C. von Eschenbach testified before the
Subcommittee on Health of the House of Representatives' Committee on Energy and Commerce
regarding the proposed Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act. He noted a few
concerns about the bill's proposal to give the FDA authority to regulate tobacco. Family Smoking
Prevention and Tobacco Control Act: Hearing on H.R. 1108 Before the Subcomm. on Health of
the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 110th Cong. (2007) (statement of Andrew C. von
Eschenbach, Comm'r, FDA), available at http://www.fda.gov/ola/2007/tobaccolOO307.html. For
example, he regarded this proposed authority to be at odds with the FDA's public health role,
since the FDA cannot "approve" the use of tobacco where there is no science to suggest ways in
which its benefits outweigh its risks. Id. In addition, he expressed unease about the budgetary
constraints that the FDA would encounter here, since it would have to develop an entirely new
program for dealing with tobacco controls. Id. The Commissioner's testimony was hardly
grounds for eager anticipation of the consequences of enactment under the Bush administration,
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But if attention to tobacco control may be flagging, the public
health impact of smoking remains as prominent as ever.3 In 2005
some 438,000 premature deaths-far and away the highest tally for
any product or substance on the market-were attributed to
smoking.4 And as the next section indicates, per capita use and trend
rates are not a cause for relaxed regulatory scrutiny. In light of these
developments, as my title suggests, I offer a view of past efficacy
and future promise of tobacco control strategies. After a summary
treatment of the demographics of smoking, indicating the distance
that has been covered in reducing tobacco use, I will discuss the
main factors contributing to that partial success story. Then, I will
address the strategies that, to my mind, have been somewhat less
successful. And finally, I will comment on the array of public health
initiatives that might sensibly be considered at this point in time.
I. SOME DEMOGRAPHICS
The baseline fact is that cigarette smoking is a twentieth century
phenomenon. Prior to 1900, cigars, chew, and a variety of other
tobacco uses were widespread, but cigarette smoking was negligible.'
By mid-century, however, its popularity was evident in all walks of
life: doctors attested to the smoothest smoking experience available;
movie stars lit up on the screen as a sign of camaraderie or romantic
interest; soldiers flocked to the commissaries on military bases for a
free supply to satisfy their daily needs. As late as 1965, 42.4 percent
but an Obama administration (and a larger Democratic majority in Congress), significantly
increases the likelihood of meaningful federal regulation. See Duff Wilson, Coming Down on
Tobacco, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 2009 at B1.
3. This Article is limited in scope to the United States. But the public health dimensions of
smoking are, of course, a worldwide problem. See Bill Marsh, A Growing Cloud Over the
Planet, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 2008 at Week in Review 4. The U.S.-based tobacco companies
continuously expand overseas markets posing distinct issues about a framework of regulatory
controls. See Lawrence 0. Gostin, Global Regulatory Strategies for Tobacco Control, 298 J. AM.
MED. ASS'N 2057 (2007); see also Vanessa O'Connell, Philip Morris Readies Aggressive Global
Push: Division Spinoff Enables Blitz of New Products; High-Tar Smokes in Asia, WALL ST. J.,
Jan. 29, 2008, at At.
4. See CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, FACT SHEET: TOBACCO-RELATED
MORTALITY (Sept. 2006), http://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/data-statistics/Factsheets/
tobaccorelated mortality.htm.
5. See BRANDT, supra note 1, at 25; see also RICHARD KLUGER, ASHES TO ASHES:
AMERICA'S HUNDRED-YEAR CIGARETTE WAR 14 (1996).
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of the adult population (over 18 years of age) smoked.6 If that year
signaled a peak, however, it also marked the inception of a steady
downward trend. By 2005, just under 21 percent of the adult
population (23 percent of males; 18.5 percent of females) continued
to smoke regularly-a striking reduction of more than 50 percent of
the adult population over forty years.7
The demographics tell a further story: 22 percent of the white
population smoked in this latest tally; 20 percent of African-
Americans; and a somewhat lower figure among Hispanics.8 In the
critical underage population, the data are somewhat less clear but
appear to indicate that about 20 percent of current high school
seniors smoke.9 Two other salient features also stand out. First, the
trend-line in adult smoking has been relatively flat over the past
decade; this, of course, is an important qualifying factor in assessing
the overall decrease of some 50 percent over the period 1965-2005."°
Second, and of similarly vital concern, smoking has become
increasingly concentrated in the lower socioeconomic groups."
Behind these demographics, of course, are many years of
experience with an array of regulatory control strategies. I will turn
next to a brief assessment of these strategies, identifying those that
seem to have been most successful in turning the tide of smoking in
this country.
6. See AM. LUNG ASS'N, TRENDS IN TOBACCO USE 16 (2007), available at
http://www.lungusa.org/atf/cf/%7B7A8D42C2-FCCA-4604-8ADE-
7F5D5E762256%7D/TRENDTOBACCOJUNE07.PDF.
7. See INST. OF MED., ENDING THE TOBACCO PROBLEM: A BLUEPRINT FOR THE NATION
51, 62 (2007) [hereinafter IOM REPORT].
8. See id. at 60. The exact Hispanic percentage per the report is 15 percent. Id. All
percentages here are from 2004.
9. See id. at 31.
10. Recent data for the first quarter of 2007 is more encouraging. See NAT'L CTR. FOR
HEALTH STATISTICS, EARLY RELEASE OF SELECTED ESTIMATES BASED ON DATE FROM THE
JANUARY-JUNE 2007 NATIONAL HEALTH INTERVIEW SURVEY 49-54 (2007),
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nhis/earlyrelease/20071208.pdf [hereinafter NCHS DATA 2007]
(reporting a sharp national reduction in smoking rates for adults, down to 18.6 percent, which is
about a 10 percent reduction in one year). The trend was flat for three years preceding the first
quarter of 2007, per the CDC chart. Id. Overall, the trend shows only a very gradual decline,
from 24.7 percent in 1997, until the recent preliminary data from 2007. Id.
11. See IOM REPORT, supra note 7, at 247-48.
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II. PRINCIPAL SOURCES OF REDUCTION IN TOBACCO USE
As an introductory proposition, it is important to point out that it
is somewhat misleading to consider the array of tobacco initiatives
independently because there can be no doubt that the aggregate effect
has been more than simply a sum of the individual contributions. It
is nonetheless possible to identify particularly salient initiatives.
With an eye to the future, I will also comment on the extent to which,
in my view, there is further mileage to be gained from these
strategies at this juncture in the life history of tobacco control.
A. Informational Initiatives on Health Risks
The starting point is the landmark Surgeon General's report of
1964.12 A decade earlier, the first authoritative laboratory studies on
the linkage between smoking and lung cancer had been published. 3
In the interim, many more studies had followed. 4 While the early
research findings did catch the attention of the public-and indeed
triggered an initial short-term health scare among smokers-it was
the Surgeon General's report, collecting the data and providing the
official imprimatur of the federal government's leading health
authority, that created a singular level of public concern. 5 The
industry responded, as it would at every subsequent stage, with new
products and creative advertising aimed at allaying public disquiet-
in particular, the filter cigarette. 6 But the foundation had been laid
for public health sensitivity to the risks of smoking.
In the ensuing years, the federal government remained
episodically involved on the informational front. The industry was
seriously caught off guard in 1967, when in response to a public
interest lawsuit, the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC")
implemented its "Fairness Doctrine" that required broadcast stations
to run antismoking messages as a counter to cigarette advertising on
12. See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, SMOKING AND HEALTH: REPORT OF
THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO THE SURGEON GENERAL OF THE PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE
(1964) [hereinafter SURGEON GENERAL 1964 REPORT].
13. See KLUGER, supra note 5, at 132-36.
14. See id. at 193-97.
15. See STANTON A. GLANTZ, THE CIGARETTE PAPERS 25 (1996) (discussing wide media
coverage of the Surgeon General's 1964 report, including THE NEW YORK TIMES and LIFE
MAGAZINE).
16. See BRANDT, supra note 1, at 244-45.
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television.17 In fact, the industry soon thereafter joined hands with its
allies in Congress in offering support for a ban on tobacco
advertising on the broadcast media; such was the perceived power of
the impact of risk-related information on the hazards of smoking."
On a significant second front, the Surgeon General, followed by
the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA"), published reports on
the risks of environmental tobacco smoke to the nonsmoking
public. 9 Once again, the model was the landmark Surgeon General's
report of the mid-1960s: neither the EPA nor the Surgeon General
undertook independent research on the hazards of secondhand smoke
exposure; rather, both agencies reviewed the aggregate findings of
the studies to date. The industry sought to discredit the findings, but
the message hit home. The public was alerted-most critically the
nonsmoking public. And the effort to ban smoking in worksites and
public places, discussed below, was given a significant boost.
17. See Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082, 1098-99 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (holding that
advertisements must count as expression covered by the fairness doctrine because of their
profound effect on consumer consciousness). For a discussion of how the "Fairness Doctrine"
affected the tobacco industry, see Kenneth E. Warner, Tobacco Policy in the United States, in
POLICY CHALLENGES IN MODERN HEALTHCARE 99, 100-102 (David Mechanic ed., 2005);
Michael Siegel, Mass Media Antismoking Campaigns: A Powerful Tool for Health Promotion,
129 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 128 (1998); James L. Hamilton, The Demand for Cigarettes:
Advertising, the Health Scare, and the Cigarette Advertising Ban, 54 REV. ECON. & STATS. 401
(1972); and Sandra J. Teel et al., Lessons Learned: From the Broadcast Cigarette Advertising
Ban, 43 J. MARKETING. 45 (1979).
18. BRANDT, supra note 1, at 267-72. On another front, Congress passed the Cigarette
Labeling and Advertising Act of 1965, which required cigarette packages to contain the message,
"Warning: Cigarette Smoking May Be Hazardous To Your Health." Federal Cigarette Labeling
and Advertising Act, Pub. L. No. 89-92, 5(b), 79 Stat. 282 (1965) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340 (1994)). In 1969, the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act upgraded the
labeling requirements requiring the warning to read, "Warning: The Surgeon General Has
Determined That Cigarette Smoking Is Dangerous To Your Health." Public Health Cigarette
Smoking Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-222, 84 Stat. 87, 88 (1970) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 1331-32, 1335-40 (1994)). These requirements were also strengthened by the 1984
Comprehensive Smoking Prevention Education Act, which mandated four rotating warnings
adopting a somewhat more stringent tone. Comprehensive Smoking Education Act, Pub. L. No.
98-474, § 4, 98 Stat. 2200, 2201-02 (1984) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(1) (1994)).
19. The Surgeon General first reported on the effects of secondhand smoke in 1972. OFFICE
ON SMOKING AND HEALTH, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., THE HEALTH
CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL 7-8 (1972) (reporting that
secondhand smoke puts nonsmokers at potential risk of developing pulmonary and cardiac
disease). In 1986 the Surgeon General concluded that secondhand smoke was a human
carcinogen. OFFICE ON SMOKING AND HEALTH, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS.,
THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF INVOLUNTARY SMOKING: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON
GENERAL 7-8 (1986) [hereinafter SURGEON GENERAL 1986 REPORT]; see also ENVTL PROT.
AGENCY, RESPIRATORY HEALTH EFFECTS OF PASSIVE SMOKING: LUNG CANCER AND OTHER
DISORDERS (1993).
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In an important sense, the most salient impact of these
governmental initiatives was that they triggered secondary
reverberations. Beginning, in fact, in the mid-1950s, before there
was any action in the regulatory arena, the Reader's Digest-at the
time the most widely read periodical in the nation-published an
article under the daunting title "Cancer by the Carton" in which the
esoteric scientific research findings on cancer risks from laboratory
studies on mice were brought home to the public.20 Since then, there
has been a steady drumbeat of newspaper and magazine coverage on
the steadily growing mountain of data depicting the wide variety of
health risks associated with smoking.
Polling data attests to the effectiveness of this steady stream of
information in raising the level of awareness of the general public,
and smokers in particular, to the risks of tobacco use, including the
addictive properties of nicotine.21 Looking to the future, however,
the question is whether the well has run dry on the promise of an
informational strategy. In my view, there does not appear to be
much left to be achieved on the informational front, as far as the
adult population is concerned. By contrast, the youth audience is
quite another matter-particularly through health measure initiatives.
But I will postpone that discussion for later when the youth smoking
population is the central focus of my analysis.22
B. Clean Air Regulations
In the mid-1960s, as public awareness of the risks of smoking
became widespread, the effects of secondhand smoke exposure
remained at most an annoyance factor for those desiring a smoke-
free workplace or restaurant setting. As long as this perspective was
dominant, the "rights" arguments remained in relative equipoise:
freedom to enjoy the pleasures of smoking versus freedom to enjoy a
smokeless environment. But this was soon to change. Beginning in
20. Roy Norr, Cancer by the Carton, READER'S DIGEST, Dec. 1952, at 7.
21. See IOM REPORT, supra note 7, at 91 ("[Mjost (96 percent) smokers, both youth and
adults, agreed that the longer you smoke, the harder it is to quit."). I discount revelations
regarding industry wrongdoing as a major contributor to reduction in use; or more precisely, I
discount this factor as a direct cause of quitting. On this score, adult smoking rates remained
relatively flat after revelations surfaced in the early 1990s. But revelations of industry
malfeasance were undoubtedly important in creating a political climate for tax increases, and for
(limited) litigation success. See infra Part III.A.
22. See infra Part IV.B.
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the mid-1970s, nonsmokers' rights groups began to press health-
based arguments. 23  Much of this activity was at the grass-roots
level-although separate nonsmoking sections on long-distance
domestic airline flights were mandated in 1973-and remained based
on speculation rather than grounded in health data until a decade or
so later.
The nonsmokers' rights movement caught fire at that point.24
Over the course of two decades, from the mid-1970s to the mid-
1990s, states and localities across the country acted to restrict
smoking in the workplace and public places of entertainment, in
tandem with the publication of widely publicized reports by the
Surgeon General and the EPA. These reports disseminated the
growing body of evidence that secondhand smoke exposure
contributed significantly to the toll of premature death from cancer
and heart disease, as well as a variety of respiratory problems in the
young.25 The rationale for regulatory restriction had moved from a
tenuous foundation in public nuisance theory to the far more solid
(and traditional) protection of public health and regulation of
externalities.
By 2006, 18 states and 342 municipalities had enacted bans on
smoking in restaurants, and as of 2005, 44 states had adopted similar
provisions targeting smoking in the workplace.26 A striking feature
of this antismoking success story is the public choice perspective:
small tightly knit coalitions banded together to exert forceful
political pressure at the state, and particularly at the local level. 27 By
contrast, the tobacco industry's success in Congress, featuring
23. See GLANTZ, supra note 15, at 391. For a brief history of the nonsmokers rights
movement and its tactics, see AMERICANS FOR NONSMOKERS' RIGHTS, RECIPE FOR A
SMOKEFREE SOCIETY (2003), available at http://www.no-smoke.org/pdf/recipe.pdf.
24. See IOM REPORT, supra note 7, at 115.
25. See SURGEON GENERAL 1986 REPORT, supra note 19, and see also ENVTL PROT.
AGENCY, supra note 19.
26. See IOM REPORT, supra note 7, at 191, 245; see also Americans for Nonsmokers'
Rights, http://www.no-smoke.org/learnmore.php?id= 185 (last visited Feb. 29, 2008) (providing a
current list of places where second hand smoke laws are in effect). Restrictions on workplace
smoking are more varied. See IOM REPORT, supra note 7, at 189. On January 1, 2008, Illinois
joined more than twenty states and many municipalities in enacting a total ban on smoking inside
places of public recreation (including restaurants, bars, and in Illinois, pool halls, casinos and
bowling alleys) and workplaces. See Monica Davey, In Illinois, a Ban Sends Smokers Out Into
the Cold, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 2, 2008, at A11.
27. See, e.g., Jane Gross, New York No-Smoking Law: Echoing Society's 'No Morel', N.Y.
TIMES, July 24, 1998, at 1.
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campaign contributions to key federal legislators,28 did not translate
into an effective strategy for fighting brushfires across the nation.
The worst fears of the industry were realized: loyal smokers huddled
together outside buildings or in alleyways, beleaguered in their
efforts to satisfy their habit.
This inconvenience factor is worth noting. While the direct
health benefits of the bans were realized by nonsmoking office and
service workers, there are data indicating what common sense would
suggest. Many smokers appear to have concluded that their habit
was no longer worth the "hassle factor" of deferring gratification to
segregated locations on work breaks or to the end of the day, and
involuntarily forgoing the pleasures of lighting up in restaurants and
bars. Hence, the secondary impact of these measures is on the
smoking population itself.
29
Once again, the question at this juncture is whether this sea
change in the smoking environment has run its course, or whether
there are remaining byways for realizing further effective restraints
on smoking.3" Ironically, perhaps, for all of the success realized by
the antismoking movement in the clean-air domain, the victim class
that figured most prominently in the epidemiological data from the
earliest studies remains relatively unprotected: children and
nonsmoking partners in private residences. This, of course, touches
a raw nerve, as it implicates regulation of lifestyle activities within
28. See Peter Pringle, Cornered: Big Tobacco at the Bar of Justice 286 (1998).
29. See 1OM REPORT, supra note 7, at 192. "Various studies have shown that smoke-free
workplace laws reduce smoking prevalence by amounts ranging from 3.8 percent to 6 percent and
consumption among continuing users by 2 percent to 14 percent." Id. at 192. "[S]moking
prevalence was inversely related to the degree of restriction of the clean indoor air policy. The
average smoking prevalence was 28 percent in states without clean indoor air laws and 24 percent
in states with extensive clean indoor air laws." Seth L. Emont et al., Clean Indoor Air
Legislation, Taxation, and Smoking Behaviour in the United States: An Ecological Analysis, 2
TOBACCO CONTROL 13, 14 (1992). Not only do these restrictions stimulate some to quit, they
also help stop relapse and help restrain some from starting (as well as aiding some in not making
the transition from being weekend social smokers to daily smokers). See IOM REPORT, supra
note 7, at 191.
30. Arguably, there remains more to be done in this area: (1) many states still do not have
secondhand smoke laws (or have weak ones); and (2) even where there are strong laws covering
areas such as public buildings, workplaces, restaurants, and bars, there are new targets that no
longer seem so daunting, such as commons areas in multi-unit housing. Also, there is currently a
strong drive to relieve people in multi-unit housing from the burdens of drifting smoke. See
Public Health Law & Policy, http://talc.phlpnet.org/pubs/publications.php?choice=newbrowse
&search=l#housing (last visited Apr. 5, 2008).
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the privacy of one's home.31 Moreover, from a practical perspective,
the enforcement issues would be daunting.
In the end, my view is that forceful initiatives in this private
sphere will be regarded politically as excessively draconian.
Although somewhat conflicted, I regard other priorities, to be
discussed below, as higher, given the intrusive social costs: better to
recognize and consolidate the political gains that have been realized
in this area and to move on to other strategies.
C. Taxation
A signal event in tobacco control was California's 1988
enactment of Proposition 99, which increased the excise tax on
cigarettes by twenty-five cents a pack.32 Against the backdrop of
exceedingly modest federal and state excise tax levels,33 the
campaign for Prop. 99 in health-conscious California was explicitly
billed as a tobacco control measure. Most states were somewhat
slow to get on the bandwagon, but eventually they did-spurred on
as much by general revenue shortfalls as by explicit anti-tobacco
sentiment. In 2002 alone, twenty-one states raised their cigarette
taxes and, within the space of a single year, the average state excise
tax had doubled from thirty-one cents to sixty-two cents per pack.34
3 1. On the periphery, there has been some movement to regulate in this domain by treating
smoking as a factor in custody/visitation proceedings and through the adoption of some
condominium regulation. See PUB. HEALTH INST. TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE LEGAL CTR.,
SMOKING IN AN APARTMENT BUILDING: WHAT CAN BE DONE TO PROTECT THE NONSMOKING
NEIGHBORS? 3 (1999), available at http://talc.phlaw.org/pdf files/0032.pdf; see also PUB.
HEALTH INST. TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE LEGAL CTR., PROTECTING CHILDREN FROM
SECONDHAND SMOKE WHEN PARENTS DIVORCE OR SEPARATE 2-4 (2003), available at
http://talc.phlaw.org/pdf files/0044.pdf. For a vivid illustration of the sensibilities stirred up in
this sphere, see Anemona Hartocollis, A Lawsuit Aimed at the Smoker Next Door, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 9, 2008, at B 1.
32. See Tobacco Tax and Health Protection Act, Cal. Prop. 99 (1988).
33. As late as 1995, state excise taxes ranged from 3 cents in Virginia to 82 cents in
Washington. See CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, STATE TOBACCO ACTIVITIES
TRACKING AND EVALUATION SYSTEM, http://apps.nccd.cdc.gov/StateSystem/
stateSystem.aspx?selectedTopic=602&selectedMeasure
= 10005&dir-legreport&ucName=UCLe
gSmkFreeSummaryExciseTax&year=1995_4&excel=htmlTable&submitBk-y (last visited Feb.
29, 2008).
34. See IOM REPORT, supra note 7, at 176. Still, the range among the states was striking; in
2007, taxes ranged from 7 cents in South Carolina to $2.58 in New Jersey. See CTRS. FOR
DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, supra note 33,
http://apps.nccd.cdc.gov/StateSystem/stateSystem.a
spx?selectedTopic=602&selectedMeasure = 10005&dirilegreport&ucName=UCLegSmkFreeSu
mmaryExciseTax&year=2007_4&excel=htmlTable.
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The key question, of course, is whether consumer demand is
sufficiently sensitive to price increases to have a substantial impact
on smoking behavior. A legion of economists has studied this
question with varying findings on price elasticity. But the
conclusion is virtually always the same: that adult smoking behavior
is quite sensitive to price increases.35 Presumably, even in the
present era, characterized by far more hardcore smokers than a
generation ago, the concentration of smokers in lower socioeconomic
groups would, if anything, enhance the price sensitivity to cigarette
consumption.
But this raises a troublesome issue, in my view. If one
recognizes the traditional taxation/confiscation argument, raising the
excise tax at some point becomes tantamount to a ban on smoking.
Linked with the regressive effects of the tobacco tax under the
current demographics, this pointedly raises paternalism and fairness
concerns that the tobacco control strategies discussed earlier (that is,
providing consumer information and regulating third-party health
effects) managed to avoid. For now, I simply pose these concerns.
The issue cannot really be resolved without recognizing its
inextricable link to reducing youth smoking by raising the tobacco
excise tax-a topic I discuss later.36
Whatever conclusions one reaches on the merits of further
reliance on tax increases, two related measures warrant discussion.
First, any discussion of tax increases would be incomplete without
reference to the Master Settlement Agreement of 1998, which I will
address from another strategic vantage point under litigation. In this
landmark settlement with the states, the five major tobacco
companies committed to paying out more than $200 billion over
twenty-five years. 7 The immediate consequence was a sharp spike
35. "Price has been found to affect virtually every measure of cigarette use, including per-
capita consumption, as derived from aggregate macro-level data as well as smoking prevalence
and the number of cigarettes smoked daily, as derived from individual micro-level data ...
Higher cigarette prices increase the probability that a current adult smoker will make an attempt
to quit." 1OM REPORT, supra note 7, at 182; see also Frank J. Chaloupka & Kenneth E. Warner,
The Economics of Smoking 4-16 (National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper No.
7047, 1999) (collecting various studies and concluding that most studies find cigarette price
elasticity to range from -0.3 to -0.5, but noting that studies have varied, and, therefore, the overall
range elasticity is from 0.14 to -1.23).
36. See infra Part IV.B.4 discussing evidence that youth are even more price sensitive than
adult smokers.
37. See BRANDT, supra note 1, at 432-34.
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in the price of cigarettes, estimated to have been a thirty-nine cent
rise in price per pack.38
In a second addendum to the discussion of excise taxes, I shift
focus to a handful of studies that have explored the interactive effects
of tax increases coupled with restrictions on smoking at worksites
and public places, and/or with informational strategies. Not
surprisingly, the findings support the intuition that documented
reductions in smoking prevalence are attributable to the synergistic
effect of pursuing these strategies in tandem.39 When tax increases
have been enacted along with roughly contemporaneous restrictions
on workplace and/or public place bans, this result is particularly
unsurprising. Once again, what I have referred to as the "hassle
factor" is prominent: the more discomfort it takes to maintain the
smoking habit--discomfort in the pocketbook along with place
restrictions-the greater the likelihood that many smokers will be
pushed to serious efforts at cessation.
More generally, as I will discuss in concluding observations, a
multi-pronged approach remains far more promising for further
reductions in the incidence of tobacco use. But before I turn to
questions of a forward-looking agenda, I will discuss the regulatory
strategies that appear to have been less successful, in my view, in
reducing tobacco use.
III. LESS SUCCESSFUL CONTROL STRATEGIES
My assessment of less successful avenues of regulatory control
begins by tracing the long and rather tortuous path taken by the
tobacco tort litigation.4" Litigation, of course, is not really a
regulatory "strategy" in the same sense as the federal, state, and local
regulatory initiatives addressed elsewhere in this Article. When the
38. See IOM REPORT, supra note 7, at 50. As part of a price war, manufacturers cut the
wholesale price of premium brand cigarettes in 1993 from $1.23 per pack to eighty-four cents to
compete with discount brands and raised it back to $1.23 right after the MSA, "in large part to
cover the cost of the settlement." Id. On the related question of the MSA price increase's
immediate impact on smoking prevalence, the IOM REPORT states that "per capita consumption
among adults has decreased unevenly from year to year [since 1985 but by] . . . 7.9 percent
between 1998 and 1999 (following the Master Settlement Agreement and price increases)." Id. at
54-56.
39. See IOM REPORT, supra note 7, at 184-85.
40. For a more detailed but earlier version of this analysis of the tobacco tort litigation, see
Robert L. Rabin, The Third Wave of Tobacco Tort Litigation, in REGULATING TOBACCO 176
(Robert L. Rabin & Stephen D. Sugarman eds., 2001).
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courts entertain lawsuits brought by private plaintiffs, they are not
engaging in the public health politics of policy formation.
Nonetheless, it is obvious that tort law is public law in the sense that
damage awards can play an important regulatory function. Whether
tort has in fact played a meaningful role in the sphere of tobacco
regulation is, of course, another matter to be assessed in the
following discussion.
A. Litigation
Beginning in the mid-1950s, there were sporadic efforts by
personal injury lawyers seeking tort compensation on behalf of
individual smokers suffering from lung cancer. Remarkably, over
the course of forty years, not a single one of these cases-more than
200 claims in total-succeeded.4'
But then the tobacco industry's fortunes shifted dramatically, as
revelations surfaced of longstanding efforts by the industry to
suppress information about the health risks of tobacco and target the
underage youth population through promotional and advertising
strategies.42  Beginning in 1993, a considerable number of
sophisticated plaintiffs' attorneys, who had previously shown no
enthusiasm for involvement in tobacco litigation, filed claims against
the industry.43 And these claims took on a new character: smokers
came to be conceptualized in aggregate terms, rather than solely as
individual victims.
The opening salvo on the tort front was Castano v. American
Tobacco Company,44 a nationwide class action filed in a Louisiana
federal district court. In a novel variation, a second front was opened
in a Mississippi state judicial forum, with the filing of a state claim
for reimbursement of healthcare expenditures on behalf of
impecunious smokers.45 At roughly the same time, the growing
sensitivity to claims of harm from exposure to environmental
41. For more about the first two waves of tobacco tort litigation, 1954-65 and 1983-92, see
Robert L. Rabin, Institutional and Historical Perspectives on Tobacco Tort Litigation, in
SMOKING POLICY: LAW, POLITICS, AND CULTURE 110 (Robert L. Rabin & Stephen D. Sugarman
eds., 1993) (discussing the singular lack of success by plaintiffs in that era).
42. See PRINGLE, supra note 28, at 77-81.
43. See BRANDT, supra note 1, at 404.
44. 160 F.R.D. 544 (E.D. La. 1995), rev'd, 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996).
45. See Complaint, Mississippi ex. rel. Moore v. Am. Tobacco Co., No. 94-1429 (Miss. Ch.
Ct. Jackson County, May 23, 1994).
1732
Summer 2008] TOBACCO CONTROL STRATEGIES
tobacco smoke triggered a class action alleging secondhand smoke-
related disease. 6  And finally, the injury claims of individual
smokers were revitalized.
What can be said about the consequences of these endeavors?
In this section, I provide an overview of these four fronts of tobacco
tort litigation, concluding that tort litigation as a regulatory strategy
for limiting tobacco use has played a highly visible but limited role
among the broad array of tobacco control strategies.
1. Class Action Tort Claims
Although the Castano nationwide class potentially represented
upwards of 40 million claimants, the case was, in a sense, narrowly
conceived. Rather than resorting to the conventional claim for
health-related damages from smoking, the Castano lawyers made
nicotine addiction the centerpiece of their case. The class was
framed to include smokers medically diagnosed as addicted and
those who had been medically advised to quit but had not yet done
so. This narrower characterization of the harm resulting from
industry conduct linked nicely with the developing evidence that
tobacco executives engaged in a disingenuous pattern of conduct, in
which they strove to conceal and misrepresent information about the
addictive properties of nicotine. Indeed, they appeared to manipulate
the content of nicotine in tobacco products.
In denying the industry's effort to get the case dismissed, the
trial judge found the technical requirements of Rule 23(b)(3) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure dealing with class actions
satisfied-in essence, finding that questions common to the class
predominated over individual questions and that the class action was
a superior vehicle for litigating the questions. 8 He reached these
conclusions (and certified the class) as to two critical issues: (1)
whether the industry had engaged in a fraudulent course of conduct;
and (2) if so, whether punitive damages were warranted. With
regard to more particularistic issues of individual reliance and case-
by-case need for medical monitoring, he decided that it would be
necessary to resolve these claims at a later stage, perhaps through
46. See Broin v. Philip Morris Cos., Inc., No. 91-49738 (22) (Fla. Cir. Ct. 1991).
47. See PR1NGLE, supra note 28, at 77-81.
48. Castano, 160 F.R.D. 544, 552-56 (E.D. La. 1995), rev'd, 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996).
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carving out subclasses. By resorting to this bifurcated approach, the
judge held that foundational issues of industry responsibility could
be tried in a consolidated fashion.
On appeal, however, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected
the class certification, relying heavily on the recently decided In re
Rhone-Poulenc Rorer,49 in which Judge Richard Posner, writing for a
panel of a different federal appellate court, decertified a class action
brought by hemophiliacs suffering from AIDS against blood solids
manufacturers. Publicly, at least, the Castano plaintiffs' attorneys
took the concern about applying the tort law of fifty states
emphasized in Rhone-Poulenc to be the gist of the Fifth Circuit's
decertification decision and accordingly went on to file "Son of
Castano" cases in a number of state courts, each of which would
have had to apply only the law of its own jurisdiction."
A careful reading of the Castano opinion, though, seemed to
belie this narrow interpretation. The Castano court saw a
considerable number of knotty problems raised by consolidation-
among others, the arguably individual determinations of reliance,
comparative fault, consumer expectations, and actual damages-that
would need to be confronted at some stage, even if they could be
disregarded in an initial phase of the trial. And most significant of
all, these issues potentially would have to be faced for some 40
million claims generated by Castano itself. In sharp contrast, there
were about a hundred or so ongoing individual claims at the time
Castano was decided-claims which might wither away or remain at
about the same quantitative level if tobacco cases continued to be
brought individually.
The aftermath of Castano largely confirmed this reading.
Virtually all of the second-round Castano cases that were filed were
eventually dismissed in state courts, thus contradicting the notion
that choice of law was the essence of the tobacco consolidation
concern." If Castano itself seemed doomed from the outset by
49. 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir. 1995).
50. See Susan E. Kearns, Decertification of Statewide Tobacco Class Actions, 74 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1336, 1353-55 (1999).
51. But see Engle v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., No. 94-8293 CA 20 (S.D. Fla. 2000), reh'g
denied, motion granted, Philip Morris, Inc v. Engle, 746 So. 2d 457 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999);
writ of error denied, R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Engle, 751 So. 2d 51 (Fla. 1999); rev'd on
subsequent appeal, Liggett Group, Inc. v. Engle, 853 So. 2d 434 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003), an
initially little-noticed Florida state court class action, filed independently of Castano (but roughly
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inevitable appeal to a conservative Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals,
one may ask why a consortium of high-powered plaintiffs' attorneys
invested so much time and money in the case. It is speculation, of
course, but a real possibility is that the team was in essence engaged
in very high stakes poker-that is, gambling that certification at the
trial court level (which did in fact occur) would create sufficient
unpredictability about a potentially catastrophic loss to persuade the
industry finally to consider the prospect of settlement. Interestingly,
this was precisely the course that unfolded in the contemporaneous
state healthcare litigation, spearheaded initially by a rival group of
plaintiffs' attorneys retained by the states.
2. The State Healthcare Reimbursement Cases
The pioneering venture in the state healthcare reimbursement
litigation, the Mississippi case, was filed roughly contemporaneously
with Castano in May 1994.52 In some ways, the two efforts to
recover for aggregated claims shared an affinity beyond near-
simultaneous filing. Both were undertaken by attorneys experienced
contemporaneously) by an attorney team with no links to the Castano lawyers, who relied on the
traditional disease-related basis for claiming injury instead of limiting their sights to an addiction-
based theory. After a circuitous route on appeal, a trial court holding that awarded three class
representative plaintiffs $12.7 million in compensatory damages and $144.8 billion in punitive
damages to the entire class was eventually vacated by the Florida Supreme Court. Engle v.
Liggett Group, Inc., 945 So. 2d 1246, 1276 (Fla. 2006). The Florida Supreme Court held that
certification of the class had not been warranted since each case would present individualized
issues of liability, affirmative defenses, and choice of law. Id. at 268. For a follow-up on
individual filings, see David Ball, Tobacco Plaintiffs Now Number 2,500, FUN. NEWS & DAILY
REC., Jan. 7, 2008, available at http://www.jaxdailyrecord.com/
showstory.php?Storyid=49186&text-; see also Scott v. Am. Tobacco, Inc., No. 968461 (La.
Dist. Ct., Orleans parish 2004).
On a related front, a number of "light cigarette" class action fraud cases have been brought under
state consumer protection statutes, claiming that "light" brands convey deceptive and misleading
messages that these cigarettes do not pose the health risks of regular brands. A closely-watched
Illinois case yielded a trial court award of $10 billion against the defendant tobacco company, but
the Illinois Supreme Court struck down the award on appeal, ruling that the FTC had authorized
the use of "light." See Price v. Philip Morris, Inc., 848 N.E.2d 1, 53-55 (Ill. 2005). Other light
cases remain in the pipeline but have not yet led to a breakthrough against the industry. See
Schwab v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 2d 992 (E.D.N.Y. 2006), rev'd, McLaughlin v.
Am. Tobacco Co., 2008 WL 878627, at *14 (2d Cir. 2008); see also Tobacco Control Legal
Consortium, http://tclconline.org/Tclc.asp (last visited Mar. 3. 2008) (providing updates on light
cigarette litigation). Another attack on this litigation involved a claim that the cases are
preempted by the federal cigarette labeling legislation. The Supreme Court rejected the
preemption claim and remanded for trial on the merits in Altria Group, Inc. v. Good, 129 S. Ct.
538 (2008).
52. Complaint, Mississippi ex. rel. Moore v. Am. Tobacco Co., No. 94-1429 (Miss. Ch. Ct.
Jackson County, filed May 23, 1994)..
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in mass tort litigation and convinced that the unfolding revelations of
industry indifference to public health concerns could be translated-
in tobacco, as in asbestos-into mass industry liability.13  But the
healthcare reimbursement claim, which would soon be replicated in
one state after another across the nation, rested on a very different
premise from Castano. Although the reimbursement claim was
based on precisely the same tort-type conduct, the state's theory of
recovery was, in fact, not based on products liability law-since the
state was not a "direct" victim suffering from tobacco-related
disease. Instead, Mississippi and the states that followed its lead
argued for relief on equitable grounds such as unjust enrichment.1
4
In essence, the states' legal theories-which later included
statutorily based claims, such as violation of consumer protection
laws-asserted that the industry's deceptive and misleading conduct
constituted a wrong against the public as well as against individual
smokers. In arguing unjust enrichment, the claim was for restitution
of public tax funds that were allocated to treating impoverished
smokers whose health problems were allegedly the industry's
responsibility. A similar theory-wrongfully profiting at the
expense of the public-undergirded claims of conspiracy and
consumer fraud, particularly those targeted against industry tactics
aimed at making smoking attractive to underage youths.5
In reality, these theories were largely untested, and the claim
that the state's interest was independent of and distinct from the
individual smoker's generally rested on a shaky foundation. 6
53. See PRINGLE, supra note 28, at 13-15.
54. See id. at 30-32.
55. For a detailed account of the strategy relied on in one key state, Minnesota, see Gary L.
Wilson & Jason A. Giller, Minnesota 's Tobacco Case: Recovering Damages Without Individual
Proof of Reliance Under Minnesota 's Consumer Protection Statutes, 25 WM. MITCHELL L. REV.
567 (1999).
56. Consider, for example, the claim of unjust enrichment. The industry was only "unjustly
enriched," presumably, if it profited from harm for which it should have been held legally
responsible. But this sounds suspiciously circular. Industry responsibility presupposes smoker
non-responsibility, which is precisely the issue at the core of the individual cases. Similarly, a
public nuisance or conspiracy claim rests on the wrongful imposition of harm on the public-
where "wrongful" once again arguably raises individual issues of reliance and comparative
responsibility, even if the tobacco companies misrepresented health information. Moreover, in
purely economic terms, the claim for recovery of healthcare costs would seem to be interlocked
with the excise tax payments levied on the industry, if not, as some economists argued, the net
health cost savings to social welfare programs from premature deaths of smokers, as well.
Compare W. Kip Viscusi, A Postmortem on the Cigarette Settlement, 29 CuMB. L. REV. 523,
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Untested or not, the theories of recovery multiplied-coming to
include deceptive advertising, antitrust violations, federal RICO
(racketeering) claims, unfair competition, a variety of fraud
allegations, and in at least two states (Florida and Massachusetts)
statutory claims based on specific healthcare cost recovery
legislation. The number of states bringing suit also multiplied. By
summer 1997, the roster had grown to forty states, with virtually
every still-uncommitted state considering action. Blue Cross and
labor union insurers were devising parallel lawsuits, and in
California, cities and counties had joined in the fray.57  The
documents told a tale of industry deceit and indifference to public
health considerations. Could trial court judges in every, or virtually
all, state healthcare recovery cases be counted on to enter favorable
summary judgments, or would the industry be at the mercy of juries
exposed to the tale of industry wrongdoing?
In the end, the industry settled individually with the four states
that were closest to trial and that, with the exception of Texas,
perhaps presented the greatest threat of a litigation setback:
Mississippi, Florida, Texas, and Minnesota. These settlements
totaled some $40 billion, to be paid out over twenty-five years. 8
Within a year, in November 1998, the industry and the forty-six
remaining states had negotiated a $206 billion Master Settlement
Agreement ("MSA") of all outstanding state healthcare
reimbursement claims. 9
It is difficult to assess the significance of the healthcare
reimbursement litigation.6' The MSA, which extinguished any
532-37 (1999), with Gary T. Schwartz, Tobacco, Liability, and Viscusi, 29 CUMB. L. REV. 555,
557-59 (1999).
57. See Milo Geyelin, Second Wind: Is Big Tobacco Reeling? Maybe Not; It Wins New
Round in Court, WALL ST. J., June 5, 1998, at Al.
58. David E. Rosenbaum, The Nation; Politics of Tobacco: Taxes vs. Kids, N.Y. TIMES, June
21, 1998, at WK4
59. See BRANDT, supra note 1, at 432-34 (describing the MSA); see also id. at 422-29
(describing a failed congressional global legislation effort that immediately preceded the MSA);
Jeffrey Taylor, A New Call for National Tobacco Laws, Prompted by States' Deal, Faces
Hurdles, WALL ST. J., Nov. 17, 1998, at Al.
60. See Stephen D. Sugarman, W Kip Viscusi's Smoke-Filled Rooms: A Postmortem on the
Tobacco Deal, 13 LAW & POL. BOOK REV. 1 (2003) (book review); Stephen D. Sugarman, Book
Reviews, 22 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 712 (2003) (reviewing MARTHA A. DERTH1CK, UP IN
SMOKE: FROM LEGISLATION TO LITIGATION IN TOBACCO POLITICS (2001); MICHAEL
PERTSCHUK, SMOKE IN THEIR EYES: LESSONS IN MOVEMENT LEADERSHIP FROM THE TOBACCO
WARS (2001); MARK WOLFSON, THE FIGHT AGAINST TOBACCO: THE MOVEMENT, THE STATE
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further liability of the industry to the states, contained some
restrictions on advertising and promotion aimed at the youth market:
billboard advertising was banned, and brand name sponsorship of
recreational activities was limited, among other things.6 But critics
pointed out that more far-reaching measures were noticeably
absent,62 such as industry "look back" penalties if scheduled
reductions in teenage smoking were not met or an acknowledgment
of the FDA's jurisdiction to regulate tobacco products-a separate
battleground that was then before the Supreme Court, which
subsequently ruled that Congress had not given the FDA regulatory
authority.63
While it is estimated that MSA payments increased the per pack
price of cigarettes by thirty-nine cents, there was no assurance that
the states would spend a significant proportion of the industry
payments on smoking reduction programs. To the contrary, it soon
became clear that the states were earmarking the funds for a variety
of projects unrelated to tobacco control and, in many instances,
bearing no relationship to public-health concerns.64 Many argued,
with some justification, that the major beneficiaries of the MSA were
AND THE PUBLIC'S HEALTH (2001). Sugarman suggests that perhaps the MSA (as well as the
tobacco litigation more generally), although intended to restrain and punish the tobacco industry,
may not have actually had that effect. MSA settlement funds have been used in many states for
public projects unrelated to tobacco harms; the costs to the industry were relatively easily passed
on to consumers; and the industry has continued to prevail in most of the litigation against it. For
these reasons, Sugarman argues that a more substantial impact on tobacco use might have been
achieved through the proposed "global" legislation, referred to supra note 59. See id. For a
similarly skeptical view, see BRANDT, supra note 1, at 432-38. Whatever the case, note that
litigation costs generally, not just MSA payments, are tantamount to a tax in raising the cost of
doing business. See Viscusi, supra note 56, at 539.
61. Some of these limitations are now largely beyond the power of Congress or the states to
enact. See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 554-55 (2001) (invalidating a number
of state and local restrictions on outdoor advertising of tobacco products on the First Amendment
and federal preemption grounds).
62. These provisions had been included in the failed Congressional settlement effort, supra
note 59. On look-back penalties as a control strategy, see Stephen D. Sugarman, Give the
Tobacco Companies Responsibility for Reducing Smoking Rates, NAT'L. LAW J., Feb. 7, 2005.
Senator Mike Enzi of Wyoming has introduced a bill in Congress that would take this approach.
63. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. FDA, 153 F.3d 155 (4th Cir. 1998), affd FDA
v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 142-44 (2000).
64. See Michael Janofsky, Tiny Part of Settlement Money is Spent on Tobacco Control, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 11, 2001, at A9. As the years passed, the diversion to other state purposes became
even more pronounced. See, e.g., Alison L. Cowan, Connecticut is Criticized on Spending on
Smoking, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 2008, at B 1.
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the plaintiffs' lawyers, who stood to realize billions in attorneys'
fees.65
In sum, the industry arguably sealed off any continuing concerns
about catastrophic liability to third-party claimants at a cost that was
regarded as unlikely to have a substantial impact on its future
revenue stream. But one looming threat on the horizon remained. In
1999, the federal government brought a civil fraud and racketeering
case against the tobacco industry,66 seeking the reimbursement of
Medicare spending, as well as civil penalties under the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO").67 While the
Medicare claim was thrown out at an early point, the RICO case
persisted68 to the surprise of those who thought the Bush
administration would allow it to wither away. The case continues at
the time of this writing, although its most significant threat to the
industry-a claim for disgorgement of illegal profits, totaling the
staggering figure of $280 billion-was dismissed on interlocutory
appeal to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.69 On
remand, the district court judge entered a remedial order, enjoining
the defendants from misrepresenting health and safety concerns,
including a ban on labeling cigarettes as "low tar" or "light" and
requiring corrective statements to be disseminated."
With the disgorgement possibility removed from the case, the
remaining claims for injunctive relief, if upheld on appeal, do not
appear to be a significant advance beyond the MSA requirements.
3. Environmental Tobacco Smoke Claims
The earliest tobacco class action effort, Broin v. Philip Morris
Cos.,7 commenced near the end of 1991 and was filed on behalf of
nonsmoking flight attendants alleging secondhand smoke injuries.72
65. See Henry Weinstein, Fees of Anti-Tobacco Attorneys Criticized, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 15,
2001, at C1. Moreover, the third-party claims of insurers and union health funds, modeled on the
state reimbursement suits, have been singularly unsuccessful, with courts dismissing the claims
on remoteness grounds. See Scott Ritter, Unions' Claims on Tobacco Firms are Rejected by
Appeals Court, WALL ST. J., May 23, 2001, at B13.
66. United States v. Philip Morris, Inc. 116 F.Supp. 2d 131 (D.D.C. 2000).
67. 18 U.S.C.. § 1961 (2000).
68. See United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 321 F. Supp. 2d 72, 82 (D.D.C. 2004).
69. United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 396 F.3d 1190, 1193 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 4, 2005).
70. United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 2d 1, 1 (D.D.C. Aug. 17, 2006).
71. 641 So. 2d 888 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
72. Complaint, Broin v. Philip Morris Cos., 641 So. 2d 888 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (No.
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The flight attendants claimed to be suffering from tobacco-related
diseases resulting from harm in the workplace-the airline cabins
where they were regularly exposed to tobacco-using passengers prior
to the 1990 ban on in-flight smoking. 3
The case was brought in Florida state court by the same
attorneys who subsequently filed the earlier-mentioned Florida state
court class action, Engle v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.," on behalf of
direct victims of smoking-related diseases. Broin was given very
little chance of succeeding when it was filed.75 This was before
Castano, let alone any indication that the aggregation technique
might generally supplant case-by-case litigation. Moreover,
secondhand smoke harm had not yet attracted the general attention
that it would after the publication of the 1992 EPA report designating
environmental tobacco smoke as a known human lung carcinogen
with no established safe level of exposure.76
To the surprise of most observers, the trial court's refusal to
grant class certification was reversed by the Florida Court of Appeal,
and the Broin class was certified for trial.7 The Court of Appeal, in
a brief opinion, made the matter seem clear cut: generic causation
and industry course of conduct were questions common to the class,
as was an assessment of the egregiousness of the defendants'
conduct. Any choice of law problems and individual issues of
damages could be decided at a later stage, the court remarked,
perhaps by recourse to subclasses-notwithstanding some 60,000
potential claims nationwide.79
Whether Broin would have survived trial is open to serious
question. As the state court of appeal opinion approving the parties'
subsequent settlement made clear, the defense had arguments of real
91-49738).
73. Broin, 641 So. 2d at 889.
74. No. 94-8293 CA 20 (S.D. Fla. 2000), reh 'g denied, motion granted, Philip Morris, Inc v.
Engle, 746 So. 2d 457 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999); writ of error denied, R.J. Reynolds Tobacco
Co. v. Engle, 751 So. 2d 51 (Fla. 1999); rev'd on subsequent appeal, Liggett Group, Inc. v.
Engle, 853 So. 2d 434 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
75. See Milo Geyelin, Flight Attendants Tobacco Trial Nears, WALL ST. J., June 2, 1997, at
B7.
76. ENVTL PROT. AGENCY, supra note 19.
77. Broin, 641 So. 2d at 890-91 (Fla. App.1994).
78. See id.
79. Id. at 891.
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substance on the merits: no generic causation, no fraud as to
secondhand smoke claimants, preclusion of suit by the statute of
limitations, among others.8" But in the midst of trial, before these
issues could be addressed, a $349 million settlement was
announced."
On closer inspection, the significance to be attached to the Broin
settlement is far less clear. Like the individual state agreements, it
came in the midst of the industry's effort to build a positive image in
support of the congressional debate over a global tobacco settlement.
It involved not a penny of compensation to the flight attendants
themselves; rather, it set up a scientific research foundation (and
made concessions on the statute of limitations and burden of proof in
any individual flight attendant cases that might be brought in the
future).,2 Perhaps most important, it is highly doubtful whether the
case has any wider applicability. In the individual workplace,
secondhand smoke cases that followed Broin-lung cancer claims
brought by a barber for long-term exposure in his shop and by a
nurse who worked for many years in a veterans' hospital-the
industry made no concessions and prevailed before juries.83 And
other occupational groups that might be consolidated are not likely to
replicate the widely-shared exposure characteristics of the flight
attendants, who themselves were still highly vulnerable to a no-
causation defense. Thus, in the aftermath of Broin, secondhand
smoke litigation has never shown promise.
4. Individual Claims
In 1996, a Florida state court claim, brought on behalf of an
individual plaintiff and framed in modest terms (conceding
comparative fault, eschewing punitive damages), broke the
industry's forty-year string of success in these cases.84 But the initial
80. Ramos v. Philip Morris Cos., Inc., 743 So. 2d 24, 32 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
81. See BRANDT, supra note 1, at 409.
82. As of December 31, 2007, the industry had prevailed in ten of eleven cases brought by
individual flight attendants. See Tresa Baldas, Big Tobacco Snuffs Out Secondhand Smoke Suits,
NAT'L. L. J., Jan. 7, 2008. The earlier estimate was that 3,125 suits might be brought. See Philip
Morris v. Jett, 802 So. 2d 353, 354 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
83. See Tobacco Industry Ruled Not Liable in Mississippi Case, WALL ST. J., June 3, 1999,
at A12.
84. See Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Carter, 723 So. 2d 833 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1998), quashed by Carter v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 778 So. 2d 932 (Fla. 2001),
cert. denied Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Carter, 531 U.S. 950 (2001).
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optimism fueled by the case (and the underlying reliance on the
damaging internal industry documents) was short lived. The
scorecard, in the immediately ensuing years, was mixed: a handful of
trial court victories (invariably subjected to long appeals) and a
roughly equal number of defeats."
By mid-2005, the tide appeared to have turned somewhat in
favor of the industry. While a $50 million punitive damage award in
Henley v. Philip Morris Inc.86 survived the appellate process87 and
joined the just-mentioned Carter case in the victory column for
plaintiffs, all of the remaining individual pro-plaintiff awards
remained on appeal, and Philip Morris was able to report a clear
drop-off in filings: in May 2005, 273 individual cases remained
pending, down 60 percent from late 1998; and only 30 new cases had
been filed in 2004.88
Putting aside the outcomes in individual cases, what are the
critical differences, if any, between the single-plaintiff tobacco tort
suits brought since the mid-1990s and those brought earlier? In
short, the distinction is in the documents. By the late 1990s, a
tobacco litigator could build a case against the industry on the
voluminous document discovery in the state healthcare-cost-recovery
suits and the class action litigation, as well as the earlier caches of
whistleblower revelations. A narrative could be woven beginning
with tobacco officials discussing, in clandestine fashion, the targeting
of teenagers before they had developed to maturity and the retention
of the adult market through the addictive powers of nicotine. In
Henley, for example, the plaintiffs attorney put together a package
of 790 damning industry documents, and although the trial judge
allowed only ten to be introduced, this was sufficient to trigger a
punitive damage award from the jury of $50 million, more than twice
the punitives that the plaintiff had, in fact, sought.89
Moreover, plaintiffs' attorneys drew not just on the same now-
public documents but consulted among each other on
85. For discussion, see Robert L. Rabin, The Uncertain Future of Tobacco Tort Litigation in
the United States, 7 TORT L. REV. 91 (1999).
86. 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d 29, 75 (Ct. App. 2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 920 (2005)
87. Id. at 75.
88. See Vanessa O'Connell, Lifting Clouds: New Tactics at Philip Morris Help Stem Tide of
Lawsuits, WALL ST. J., May 11, 2005, at Al.
89. See Henley, 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 74.
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micromanagement issues: which documents to rely on, which lines
of argument to pursue, and which expert witnesses to call. By 1999,
the Tobacco Trial Lawyers Association had been formed, an
organization dedicated to networking and coordination among those
involved in tobacco trial litigation. And by then, the term "trial in a
box" had come to characterize plaintiff attorney preparation in the
individual cases.90
But as the returns to date indicate, if large liability awards now
seem a possibility as never in the past, the industry still remains
armed with effective weapons. Relying on the strongly
individualistic strand in American culture, freedom of choice can still
be mustered as a powerful defense. This is especially true as the
industry shifted ground and confessed to its past machinations,
arguing instead that it has now reformed its ways under new
"enlightened leadership."'" If the documents are eventually viewed
as a matter of only historical interest and if the industry concedes that
addiction means it is very hard but nonetheless possible to quit-and
this plaintiff, unlike so many other ex-smokers knowledgeable of the
health risks, did not demonstrate the requisite will power-it may be
that the freedom-of-choice defense will remain a powerful weapon.92
Another shift in grounds, away from a defense that eventually
became an embarrassment, has now taken place. From the outset of
the litigation, the industry argued that the causal link between
smoking and allegedly tobacco-related diseases had never been
conclusively established: correlation is not causation. This
argument, too, finally became an albatross, not just because of the
voluminous epidemiological findings but also because of the
hypocrisy revealed in the documents. But the concession of generic
causation does not close the door on arguing that the particular
plaintiff before the court has a type of lung cancer not strongly
90. See Gordon Fairclough, California May be Hazardous to Big Tobacco's Health, WALL
ST. J., June 8, 2001, at B1.
91. Rick Bragg, Tobacco Industry has Changed Its Ways, Executive Says, N.Y. TIMES, June
13, 2000, at A24. But the confessions of past sins were certainly no sure bet before an otherwise-
incensed jury, as is indicated by the $3 billion award in Boeken v. Philip Morris Inc., 26 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 638 (Ct. App. 2005). For subsequent history of the case, see infra note 99.
92. But there is a possible interplay here between the fruits of the Master Settlement
Agreement (the state healthcare cost reimbursement initiative) and the individual cases. To the
extent that MSA funds (or, for that matter, other sources of funding as well) are allocated to
counter-advertising, they may keep the public's attention focused on a message that this is a
death-dealing industry.
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associated with smoking, or died from an independent disease, or
died from lung cancer but was massively exposed to asbestos, and so
forth. Because of the long latency of tobacco-related disease, the
plaintiffs life history often creates the possibility of multiple causes
of life-threatening illness.
These latter considerations bring us back full circle to the matter
of cost. It remains the case, as in the earlier individual litigation, that
expert witnesses are central to trying a tobacco tort case. The
documents do not change this critical feature of the cases. The
etiology of tobacco-related disease frequently requires the testimony
of a pathologist, a pharmacologist, an oncologist, an epidemiologist,
an addiction specialist, and public health experts. Aside from the
health perspective, there is frequently the need for experts on the
marketing, promotion, and product design aspects of the case. And,
as long as the plaintiffs risk-taking proclivities remain an element of
the defense strategy, a laundry list of character witnesses from the
plaintiffs past-with corresponding pretrial deposition and
interrogatory costs-is likely to be a staple of these cases. The short
of it is that the documents, as a somewhat standardized package, go
part of the way towards reducing the costs of tobacco tort litigation.
But they only go part of the way.
The cases remain expensive and time-consuming propositions as
long as they are vigorously contested by the industry. And the
leverage that industry defendants secure from uncertainty of outcome
is heightened considerably by the U.S. Supreme Court's increasingly
proactive stance regarding due process limitations on the size of
punitive damage awards.93 In this litigation environment, there is no
reason to think that the defense needs to win every case in order to
maintain an affordable product.
5. A Public Health Perspective on the Tobacco Litigation
The contribution that tobacco litigation in the United States has
made to the control of smoking can be discussed from three distinct
perspectives. In traditional tort terms, the litigation can be evaluated
93. See Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 127 S. Ct. 1057, 1060 (2007) (holding that punitive
damages award based in part on jury's desire to punish defendant for harming nonparties violated
due process); State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 429 (2003) (holding that
an award of $145 million in punitive damages on a $1 million compensatory judgment violated
due process).
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from a deterrence perspective. From a broader public health vantage
point, the litigation can be viewed as one among many strategies
currently employed to reduce smoking, and the question can be
asked whether litigation has had a positive interactive effect with
these other approaches. Finally, the tobacco litigation can be
evaluated as a medium for educating the public.
a. Litigation as a regulatory regime: Deterrence
For a generation now, a principal theme in tort theory has been
the articulation of the deterrent role of tort.94 This theme has been
particularly evident in the modem development of liability in tort for
product injuries-the domain that includes smoking-related harm.
Deterrence theory has provided the underlying foundation for claims
of inadequate warning and defectively dangerous design.95
In the real world of tobacco litigation, however, deterrence
considerations operate so haphazardly as to lose virtually all
meaning. The major costs imposed on the tobacco industry through
a half century of litigation have been the $206 billion settlement with
the states (and the associated billions in earlier settlements with four
individual states) and the untold millions in industry lawyers' bills to
contest liability on all fronts-estimated in 2000 to have been in the
neighborhood of $900 million annually.96 The former cost (the state
settlements) bears no rational relationship to any intelligible notion
of appropriate deterrence. It represents nothing more than the
political outcome of what the traffic would bear after four years of
jousting with the states over public healthcare costs (supplemented
later in the litigation by a variety of unfair business practice claims).
Similarly, the massive litigation costs of a half-century of tort
warfare conform to no fine-tuned theoretical objective of
internalizing accident costs.
This is not to say that the massive financial expenditures
imposed on the industry to buy a measure of peace have had no
regulatory effect on smoking. To the extent that these costs are
94. See GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS (Yale University Press 1970);
WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW
(1987).
95. See John Hanson & Kyle Logue, The Costs of Cigarettes: The Economic Case for Ex
Post Incentive-Based Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 1163, 1173-78 (1998).
96. Milo Geyelin & Gordon Fairclough, Taking a Hit: Yes, $145 Billion Deals a Huge Blow,
But Not a Killing One, WALL ST. J. July 17, 2000, at Al.
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internalized in the price of tobacco products, they are reflected in
price increases and affect demand for tobacco.97 Reportedly, sharp
price increases, beginning in late 1998 after the multi-state
settlement, resulted in a drop in domestic cigarette consumption of
about 7 percent in 1999.98 But the point is that the costs bear no
particular relationship to the goal of imposing on the industry a
burden that reflects its proper responsibility for the disease-related
harm associated with smoking.
Nothing about the recent mixed record of litigation success
against the industry since the mid-1990s changes this conclusion. To
the extent that these victories stand on appeal, they sharply
underscore the uncertainty and potential for catastrophic loss arising
from punitive damage awards.99 But these punitive damage awards,
in turn, reflect no more than isolated resolutions of the morality play
of victim versus industry in which a particular jury decides to "send a
message" to the industry. Again, a string of these awards will affect
price and consequent demand. Indeed, in the improbable scenario of
a groundswell of individual awards or even a single multi-billion
dollar aggregate award, the financial viability of the industry might
be threatened. However, this affords no clear signal, whether from a
public health or economic efficiency perspective, that tobacco
97. See W. Kip Viscusi, Overview, in REGULATION THROUGH LITIGATION 1, 3 (W. Kip
Viscusi ed., 2002) (arguing that tobacco settlements "establishe[d] a tax on the product payable to
the plaintiff and paid for almost entirely by the consumer rather than a damages payment paid for
by the defendant."); Clara Sue Ross, Comment, Judicial and Legislative Control of the Tobacco
Industry: Toward a Smoke-Free Society?, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 317, 337 (1987) (noting that effect
of price increases on demand for tobacco products depends on factors like consumer's age and
income, with younger smokers being most responsive to price increases (citing Kenneth E.
Warner, Smoking and Health Implications of a Change in the Federal Cigarette Excise Tax, 255
J. AM. MED. ASS'N 1028, 1029 (1986)).
98. Geyelin & Fairclough, supra note 96. But this report on consumption effects must be
read in the context of the ten-year data, indicating a relatively flat trend in cigarette consumption.
See NCHS DATA 2007, supra note 10.
99. As indicated, this potential for catastrophic punitive damage awards has been reduced by
recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions placing constitutional due process constraints on unbounded
awards. See Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 127 S.Ct. 1057 (2007); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003). In this regard, see Bullock v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 71
Cal. Rptr. 3d 775, 802-07 (Ct. App. 2008), in which the court overturned a $28 million punitive
damage award on the basis of a jury instruction inconsistent with the due process limitations
established in Williams. On the other hand, in Boeken v. Philip Morris, Inc., 19 Cal. Rptr. 3d
101, 108 (Ct. App. 2004), the trial court reduced a $3 billion jury award for punitive damages to
$100 million. Id. at 108. On appeal, the court further reduced this award to $50 million. Id. at
148. Final judgment in this latter amount was entered upon the appellate court's reconsideration
in light of State Farm. See Boeken v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 26 Cal. Rptr. 3d 638, 684-87 (Ct.
App. 2005), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1018 (2006).
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litigation is having the desired impact on smoking."°° And suppose,
for a moment, that the opposing scenarios were to play out-that is,
the litigation essentially dries up, through a (not inconceivable)
combination of reversals on appeal and unsympathetic juries. Would
the urgency of the public health concern be any less?
In any event, it seems apparent that tort liability is an
exceedingly blunt weapon for doing battle with tobacco on the
consumer demand front. Clearly, the industry can no longer stand
behind its long-time boast that not a penny has been paid out in tort
liability, not after the state settlements and the still-uncertain bill of
continuing individual litigation. But the boast was always illusory in
a sense. From the outset, the industry spared no litigation expense in
battling tort liability.'' Then, as now, the costs of litigation had
some impact on the price of tobacco; now, it is far larger."2 At no
time, however, have litigation-associated costs operated as a rational
scheme from a regulatory perspective in affecting the demand for the
product. Put another way, tort is a haphazard public health strategy
because it is powerfully influenced, in the tobacco arena, by ever-
changing ethical judgments about the scruples of the contestants and
extraordinary investments of lawyering activity in attempting to
stage an effective appeal to moral sensibilities. It is not a forward-
looking strategic device that aims to achieve defined risk-reducing
goals through the medium of liability awards.
b. Litigation and complementary control strategies
In one sense, the public health aims and accomplishments
achieved through the array of regulatory initiatives discussed in this
Article highlight the limitations of litigation as a regulatory strategy.
Because recent data indicate that the smoking rate among teenagers
100. In fact, insolvency itself would arguably have only a minimal impact on the availability
of tobacco, albeit perhaps under a rather different regime of promotion and distribution after
corporate reorganization in bankruptcy.
101. See Rabin, supra note 41.
102. See Peter D. Jacobson & Soheil Soliman, Litigation as Public Health Policy: Theory or
Reality?, 30 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 224, 234-35 (2002) (noting that tobacco litigation costs resulted
in price hikes); see also U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., REDUCING TOBACCO USE:
A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL 322-37 (2000) available at
http://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/data statistics/sgr/sgr2000/00_pdfs/FulReport.pdf (discussing the
evidence of the relationship between price and demand for tobacco products).
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remains a serious concern°-and it is well-established that smoking
initiation is largely a youth phenomenon114--a powerful case can be
made, as I discuss in a following section, that reducing underage
smoking is the most salient of tobacco control goals. There is little
reason to think that tort litigation contributes much in a direct sense
to achieving this objective. Tort awards translate into money
judgments to smoking victims rather than compelling retailers to
check the age of cigarette purchasers, dictating the character of
tobacco advertising, or proscribing the possession of cigarettes.
At the same time, however, it is possible to argue that tort has
had an indirect sanctioning effect. To the extent that the tobacco
industry expends large sums on defense and in resolving liability
controversies, these costs of doing business lead to increases in the
price of cigarettes-most apparent, perhaps, in the state health-cost
reimbursement settlements with the states-which would have a
positive impact on reducing minors' smoking. Similarly, as
mentioned, the settlements with the states did provide for limited
controls on advertising and promotion, as well as generating
revenues that are used in some instances to fund counter-
advertising." 5 In the larger scheme of things, however, it is difficult
to make the case for any major inroad in teenage smoking as a result
of tort liability.
With respect to adult smokers, as I have discussed above, the
most effective long-term public health measures appear to be the
increasingly stringent controls on smoking in the workplace and in
places of public accommodation. In this sphere of conduct control,
tobacco litigation, in contrast to legislative activity, has no
103. See NAT'L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, HEALTH, UNITED STATES, 2007: WITH
CHARTBOOK ON TRENDS IN THE HEALTH OF AMERICANS 28 (2007) available at
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/hus/hus07.pdf (reporting that 23 percent of high school students
smoked at least one cigarette in the 30 days preceding the survey).
104. In the United States, almost 90 percent of smokers have their first cigarette before the
age of eighteen. See SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN., RESULTS FROM
THE 2005 NATIONAL SURVEY ON DRUG USE AND HEALTH: NATIONAL FINDINGS 51 (2006),
available at http://www.oas.samhsa.gov/nsduh/2k5nsduh/2k5results.pdf.
105. There is a major caveat, however. In addition to the diversion of settlement funds to
non-tobacco uses, see supra text accompanying note 64, it appears that the tobacco industry
found ways to circumvent the restrictions on magazine advertising aimed at youths. See Alex
Kuczynski, Tobacco Companies Accused of Still Aiming Ads at Youths, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15,
2001, at Al.
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immediately apparent complementary role to play (nor has it played
any role until now).
c. Educational effects
In recent years, public opinion polls have consistently indicated
that the public, including the smoking public, is well aware of the
health risks of smoking." 6 Indeed, the industry has used this
information to its own end in the tort litigation, as a buttress to its
argument that smokers assume the risk of smoking-related disease."7
In my view, however, tobacco tort proponents cannot lay claim to a
significant role in creating a risk-informed public. It is important to
recognize that prior to the filing of Castano and the healthcare
reimbursement suits, tobacco tort litigation was a distinctly low-
visibility enterprise. And by the time those cases were filed, the
health risks of tobacco were already common knowledge by virtue of
the public and media informational strategies discussed earlier in this
Article.
By contrast, the addictive properties of nicotine had received
less attention through the early 1990s. But here, too, the educational
role of tort is hard to assess. The whistleblower-leaked documents
that provided support for Castano and the state healthcare
reimbursement suits were simultaneously distributed to leading news
media, congressional representatives, the FDA, and public health
activists. 8 In particular, the joint appearance of tobacco executives
before the Waxman congressional committee, in which they avowed
ignorance of the effects of nicotine, focused nationwide attention on
nicotine addiction, as did the TV documentary Day One. 9 Thus, it
seems fair to say that by the mid-1990s the channels of public
communication of health information about the risks of tobacco were
filled to overflowing, making it impossible to identify a singularly
influential source.
106. See, e.g., Lydia Saad, Special Report: Tobacco and Smoking, GALLUP, Aug. 15, 2002,
available at http://www.gallup.com/poll/9910/Tobacco-Smoking.aspx.
107. See, e.g., Glassner v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 223 F.3d 343, 352 (6th Cir. 2000)
(holding that plaintiff had common knowledge of risks of smoking because at time plaintiff
started smoking, there was widespread public awareness of these risks, and plaintiff "continued to
smoke even after" label warnings were strengthened).
108. See PRINGLE, supra note 28, at 54, 73-76.
109. See BRANDT, supra note 1, at 358-63.
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Nonetheless, a meaningful distinction can be drawn between the
key sources of public information about the health risks of tobacco,
and beginning in 1993, the most salient source of information on the
unfolding narrative concerning the industry's pattern of concealing
and misrepresenting its own understanding of those health risks over
a period of some thirty years. On this latter score, the determined
efforts at pre-trial discovery in litigation-such as that pursued by
the state of Minnesota in its healthcare reimbursement suit--did in
fact stand out as a source of public information."' As in the earlier
case of asbestos, the full story of the industry's conscious disregard
for the health effects of its profit-making activity might never have
become a part of the public record in the absence of the tort
litigation.'
If this is correct, tort law (in the tobacco context) has been
notable not so much because of its direct contribution to
compensating smokers or shaping public health but for its
contribution to the unfolding documentation of public affairs. In that
regard, the consequent rise in public disapproval of the industry
plausibly could have contributed to the political climate in which the
excise tax and secondhand smoke legislation were enacted.
B. Restrictions on Advertising and Promotion
As discussed earlier, the first major initiative in this domain was
the ban on broadcast media advertising in 1969.112 But this was at
best a mixed success from a public health perspective. The ban
swept counter-advertising, which had been highly effective, off the
air along with tobacco commercials, and at the same time, it led the
industry to shift resources into other venues-heightened
promotional activities, print, and billboard advertising." 3
What followed was a generation of exposure to the Marlboro
Man, Joe Camel, and a variety of other creative industry marketing
110. For detailed treatment of the Minnesota strategy, see Michael Ciresi et al., Decades of
Deceit: Document Discovery in the Minnesota Tobacco Litigation, 25 WM. MITCHELL L. REV.
477 (1999).
111. On asbestos, see PAUL BRODEUR, OUTRAGEOUS MISCONDUCT: THE ASBESTOS
INDUSTRY ON TRIAL (1985). For a more detailed treatment of the educational effects of tort
litigation, see Robert L. Rabin, Reassessing Regulatory Compliance, 88 GEO. L.J. 2049, 2068-70
(2000).
112. See supra text accompanying note 17.
113. See IOM REPORT, supra note 7, at 113-14.
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initiatives where its portrayals of the pleasures of smoking went
largely unchallenged-in the context of serious First Amendment
commercial speech and federal preemption issues lurking in the
shadows if regulatory efforts had been pursued.'14
Against this backdrop, it is perhaps unsurprising that the next
notable set of restrictions came through a voluntary settlement
between the states and the industry, rather than by direct
governmental regulation. In the MSA, the tobacco companies agreed
to restrictions on industry marketing (including the elimination of
cartoon characters and billboard advertising, and the restriction of
industry sponsorship of recreational events) and political activity
(including the disbanding of the Tobacco Institute and the Council
for Tobacco Research).1 5  But once again, the import of these
restrictions is debatable. Ever resourceful, the industry reallocated
its advertising and promotional budget to the retail sales
environment, where it operates relatively free of regulatory
constraints." 6 At the same time, a not insignificant amount of
positive reinforcement of smoking behavior flourishes on the motion
picture screen and in remaining magazine advertising.1 7
This brief recounting suggests very modest inroads, at most, as a
consequence of advertising restrictions. Consider the long view. In
the twentieth century, advertising transformed the role of smoking in
popular culture. 8 From early on, the industry promoted female
smoking through imagery of the independent and glamorous woman.
Similarly, the male population was targeted through portrayals of
smoking associated with rugged individualism, most effectively
embodied in the Marlboro Man years. In a like vein, industry
documents reveal conscious efforts to target minority groups and the
114. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 558-59 (2001). Joe Camel ads were
eventually banned. See Mangini v. RJ Reynolds Tobacco Co., 875 P.2d 73 (Cal. 1994), overruled
by In re Tobacco Cases II, 163 P.3d 106 (Cal. 2007) (overruling on grounds of preemption by
federal cigarette warning legislation). However, the ad ban took effect only after years of
exposure and strong evidence of positive imagery in the youth population. See J. DiFranzia et al.,
RJR Nabisco's Cartoon Camel Promotes Camel Cigarettes to Children, 266 J. AM. MED. ASS'N
3149 (1991).
115. See 1OM REPORT, supra note 7, at 123.
116. See generally id. at app. L.
117. See Smoke Free Movies, http://www.smokefreemovies.ucsf.edu/solution/index.html (last
visited Mar. 31, 2008).
118. See BRANDT, supra note 1, at 262.
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youth population." 9 And frequently, advertising campaigns took
explicit aim at countering popular anxieties over health effects,
illustrated vividly by the vigorous promotion of the filter cigarette as
a counter to the early Surgeon General's report.'
2
1
And in these years where was regulation of advertising directed
at countering these multiple channels of promoting tobacco use? It
was nowhere to be found. Moreover, as I have suggested, when
restrictions on one medium of advertising were adopted, the industry
creatively shifted to another.
Without a doubt, banishing tobacco ads from billboards, sports
stadiums, and promotional wear, per the MSA, has been a salutary
move, even if the precise impact on smoking prevalence cannot be
measured. But further efforts in this vein, such as proposed black-
and-white-only advertising, 12' not only are dubious on First
Amendment grounds but seem to me of marginal benefit. The case
for meaningful impact has to rest on the premise that "tombstone"
advertising, to stay with the noted proposal, as compared to present
visual advertising, will lead to substantial further reductions in the
attractiveness of smoking in a present-day environment where the
serious health effects of tobacco are widely recognized and where
MSA-based restrictions on locality and imagery are already in place.
This seems to me a hard case to make out.
If an assessment of advertising restrictions and litigation
initiatives does not appear especially promising for the future and if
many of the more successful past strategies have perhaps provided
about as much momentum as can reasonably be expected, then the
question is whether pathways can be identified that might be
fruitfully taken now in combating the continuing high mortality rate
from smoking.
IV. WHAT NEXT?
A. Adult Smoking
In a somewhat perverse sense, the hardcore 20 percent of the
adult population that continues to smoke serves as a reality check on
the successful implementation of an array of tobacco control
119. See IOM REPORT, supra note 7, at 247-48.
120. See id. at 48.
121. Seeid. at 323-37.
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strategies discussed earlier-successes realized predominantly
through provision of information about health risks, protection of
third parties, and taxation. The message seems clear. Unless excise
tax levels rise to the point of constituting a de facto ban on smoking,
we are at a crossroads where there either is no further governmental
coercion of adult smokers or public policy commits to a new package
of strategic approaches to controlling tobacco use.
At the outset, however, why not a de facto ban through
aggressive use of the excise tax? As a practical concern, a smoking
ban carries all of the attendant risks of smuggling and other illegal
forms of access. The historical experience in the Prohibition Era has
left an indelible imprint on American political thought. But more
fundamentally, an outright ban raises the ethical issue of whether the
state should engage in such a proactive course of paternalism. The
addictive character of cigarettes complicates the latter question, of
course, but it does not put it to rest.
1 22
If, at first blush, this seems to argue for leaving the adult
smoking population alone, the matter is not quite so straightforward
in my view. First, it seems strongly advisable to maintain a steady
state of health information awareness, rather than allowing public
awareness to grow stale or retreat into the background as other health
concerns assume centerstage. This can be done in part through
reliance on continuing news media attention to findings on the health
risks of smoking, but research funding (and corresponding advances
in etiological findings), like public attentiveness, tends to flow in
new directions as the scientific community explores fresh challenges
on the disease frontier. Hence, there is a need to maintain a
governmental commitment to funding counter-advertising by
antismoking forces that will continue to make vivid to smokers the
long-term hazards of indulging in tobacco use.'23
In addition, smoking cessation services can be thought of as a
default strategy of sorts for those adult smokers who do desire to
quit. A recently offered proposal along these lines would be to
require all insurance, managed care and employee benefit plans,
122. For a thoughtful perspective on the addictive character of cigarette smoking, see N.L.
Benowitz & J.E. Henningfield, Establishing a Nicotine Threshold for Addiction: The Implications
for Tobacco Regulation, 331 NEW ENG. J. MED. 123 (1994).
123. As the data on public place restrictions indicate, see supra note 26, another goal might be
wider dispersal of smoke-free public place laws.
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including Medicaid and Medicare, to cover reimbursement for
effective smoking cessation programs as a lifetime benefit, in
addition to employing mass media techniques to increase demand for
these programs. 1
24
Finally, federal regulation could play a crucial role here. A
successful effort to grant the FDA regulatory authority over tobacco
could make possible a long-term strategy that, carefully
implemented, might finally address the addiction problem;
specifically, ratcheting down, in incremental fashion, the nicotine
content of cigarettes. The behavioral issues here are not
straightforward; among other salient points is the research indicating
compensating behavior on the part of smokers-inhaling more
deeply and smoking down to the filter in past experimental efforts to
introduce low-nicotine cigarettes.125  But these problems are not
insuperable, and there is another positive dimension to this strategy:
the spillover effects on the residual youth population that will
invariably "graduate" to the class of adult smokers, no matter how
effective the next generation of youth prevention strategies.
Beyond these measures, I would leave the adult population
alone. It is important to retain perspective on the fact that for some
smoking is a pleasurable and/or psychologically rewarding
experience. And correlatively, we should not lose perspective on the
question of how restrictive a society we want to create-that is, how
far we want to go in reducing individual autonomy, including what
can be perceived as self-destructive behavior. In this regard, adult
smoking, as its rights-based proponents have long argued, is on a
continuum with other self-harming behavior, whether it be engaging
in risk-laden dietary habits or hazardous adventurous pursuits.
124. For a broad ranging strategy for promoting smoking cessation services, see IOM
REPORT, supra note 7, at 231-41. In particular, David Levy notes the importance of services
such as a well-publicized quitline, accompanied by free nicotine replacement therapy for a
specified period of time and other behavioral and pharmaco-therapy. See id. at apps. J-7, J-8.
The IOM defends its recommendation that these services receive lifetime coverage from insurers
on the grounds that the costs of cessation treatment will be offset by the decrease in lost-
productivity costs and healthcare costs for no-longer-continuing smokers. See id. at 239. For a
concise discussion of an array of smoking cessation strategies, see Jane E. Brody, Trying to Break
Nicotine's Grip, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 2008 at D7.
125. See Jed E. Rose & Frederique M. Behm, Effects of Low Nicotine Content Cigarettes on
Smoke Intake, 6 NICOTINE & TOBACCO RES. 309 (2004); see also NAT'L CANCER INST.,
MONOGRAPH 13: RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH SMOKING CIGARETTES wiTH Low MACHINE-
MEASURED YIELDS OF TAR AND NICOTINE (2001) [hereinafter MONOGRAPH].
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B. Youth Smoking
Regulating youth smoking is another matter. Like provisions for
information and regulation of third-party effects, there is a
longstanding tradition, grounded in the concept of parens patriae, for
government taking proactive steps to safeguard the youth population
from the hazards of immaturity. In the case of smoking, the
argument for protective action is especially strong: it is well
documented that the overwhelming majority of smokers begin
smoking in their teenage years,'26 when the long-term risks of
contracting a fatal disease are heavily discounted and the
vulnerability to peer pressures is at its highest. Since
experimentation then slides to addiction, youth is the gateway to
adult habituation.
The regulatory framework discussed earlier plays out differently
in the case of the youth population. To begin with, the paradox of
strongly discouraging a lawful activity is absent: it is illegal in every
state to smoke under the age of eighteen.'27 As a consequence, the
starting point for a regulatory policy-indeed, the endpoint if it were
truly effective-might logically seem to be regulation of supply
through state and local enforcement of the prohibition of sales to
minors. 2
1. Youth Access
In 1992, Congress enacted the Synar Amendment, aimed at
addressing the continuing illegal sales of tobacco to minors. '29 The
legislation required that all states enact and enforce youth access
laws, with the sanction of loss of federal block grant substance abuse
126. See MONOGRAPH, supra note 125. Recently, the industry has launched a marketing
campaign aimed at the 18-24 age group. Here the rates seem not to be going down. One risk is
that reduced childhood smoking will become only delayed smoking. For a discussion of this
concern, see Stephen D. Sugarman, A Balanced Tobacco Control Policy, 93 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH
416, 416-18 (2003), available at http://www.ajph.org/cgi/content/abstract/93/3/416, in which
Sugarman comments on Sherry Glied, Is Smoking Delayed Smoking Averted?, 93 AM. J. PUB.
HEALTH 412 (2003), available at http://www.ajph.org/cgi/content/abstract/93/3/412 (follow "Full
Text (PDF)" hyperlink) (raising delayed onset as a potentially substantial problem).
127. Eighteen is also the age requirement under federal law. Alcohol, Drug Abuse, and
Mental Health Reorganization Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-321, § 202, 106 Stat. 323, 394-95
(1992) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300x-26 (West 2008)) [hereinafter Synar Amendment].
128. For a more detailed version of the following two sub-sections on youth access and point
of purchase promotion and advertising see IOM REPORT, supra note 7, app. L at 641-52.
129. See Synar Amendment, supra note 127.
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and treatment funding for non-complying states. Under subsequently
adopted DHSS regulations, states were required to reduce the rate of
retailer violations of youth access laws to 20 percent or less by
2003.3 °
The Synar Amendment reflected the fact that in the 1990s, when
attention focused on youth access, there was a widespread perception
that states and localities were simply not enforcing these provisions
with any vigor. 13' This striking indifference to enforcement,
however, masked widespread agreement among tobacco control
activists and public health experts on the provisions that would be
incorporated in a model access restriction law. The principal
guideposts, summarized by one leading authority, were to: (1)
establish a minimum age of at least 18; (2) require that retailers
establish proof of age through checking identification; (3) create a
tobacco sales licensing scheme; (4) require periodic tests of retailers'
compliance; (5) establish administrative or civil law penalties for
illegal sales; and (6) prohibit self-service displays of tobacco
products.'32 The existing state and local laws on the books, as might
be expected, incorporated many of these provisions. 1
3
Once the Synar Amendment came into effect, the logical inquiry
was whether it would exert an independent positive influence on
state and local enforcement practices. Unfortunately, that appeared
not to be the case. An analysis of 1997 substance abuse block grant
applications from all states concluded that "states and DHHS are
violating the statutory requirements of the Synar Amendment
rendering it ineffective.'
'1 34
130. In a complementary move, the FDA adopted a comprehensive set of youth regulations in
1996 that included a major compliance check program under the auspices of the Agency. The
regulations had a short shelf-life, however: the FDA program was invalidated by the U.S.
Supreme Court in 2000 on the grounds that tobacco regulation was outside the scope of the
Agency's authority. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 142-44 (2000).
13 1. Nancy Rigotti documents a considerable number of studies, beginning in 1987 and
extending well into the 1990s revealing widespread merchant indifference to the laws and a like
indifference on the part of enforcement authorities. See Nancy A. Rigotti et al., US. College
Students' Use of Tobacco Products: Results of a National Survey, 284 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 699
(2000), cited by IOM REPORT, supra note 7, app. A at 380.
132. See id.
133. In a considerable number of instances, however, local ordinances that appeared strong, at
least as written, were diluted by weaker state laws preempting inconsistent local provisions.
134. See DiFranzia, supra note 114.
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During the late 1990s, a number of studies were conducted of
communities that did engage in proactive enforcement, in order to
assess the efficacy of these efforts. A detailed analysis of the studies
through 2001 concluded that the results in terms of efficacy were
mixed, at best. 35 Later studies simply reconfirm this discouraging
picture of supply-side restrictions, underscoring two critical
dimensions of the problem in reducing tobacco use by minors
through access restrictions. 36 At the threshold, there is the temporal
concern: that is, the very real prospect that a short-term commitment
to vigorous enforcement will yield only short-term effects as staying
power by the enforcement authorities has yet to be demonstrated.
The still more complicated factor is the presence of noncommercial
sources of tobacco-friends and family-as alternative sources,
which appear to play a more significant role when commercial
sources are subjected to closer scrutiny. 37
In the final analysis, while the efficacy of proactive enforcement
has yet to be established, it can be argued that continued efforts at
supply-side access restrictions are warranted, not as the endpoint of
an effective tobacco control policy but as a complementary
component of a comprehensive package of control initiatives. If for
no other reason, there is the symbolic value of demonstrating that the
public commitment to reducing tobacco use in the critical early years
of smoking initiation is not simply a matter of lip-service. Beyond
this, on the basis of presently available data, it cannot be predicted
with any degree of confidence that positive outcome determinations
in smoking prevalence will result from investing resources in
proactive merchant compliance activities (although recent experience
in New York, discussed below, provides some grounds for cautious
optimism).38
135. See Rigotti, supra note 131. Another approach, either complementary or taken
independently, would be to criminalize either purchase or possession, relying from a deterrence
perspective on the threat of criminal action against the purchasing minor (demand side), as well
as the vendor of the product. In tandem, these sanctions might prove more efficacious than
relying exclusively on punishing the seller.
136. See IOM REPORT, supra note 7, app. L at 643.
137. Studies post-2001 suggest that the effectiveness of commercial restrictions is often
undercut by social access to cigarettes. Youth smokers perceived access to cigarettes as easier
than nonsmoking youth, and 65 percent of youth smokers reported acquiring cigarettes from
noncommercial sources such as family and friends. See id.
138. See infra notes 175-176 and accompanying text.
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2. Point of Purchase Promotions and Advertising
As mentioned, with the adoption of the MSA in 1998, billboard
advertising was prohibited, brand item logos were limited, and public
entertainment forum signage was sharply restricted.'39 As a
consequence, there was a dramatic shift in the tobacco industry's
advertising and promotion budgets.141 In 2000, tobacco
manufacturers spent $4.26 billion on point-of-sale advertising and
promotional programs and $3.52 billion on retail value-added items
(free gifts, multi-pack discounts)--expenditures totaling over 80
percent of cigarette manufacturers' marketing budgets for the year. 141
The main venues of such advertising are convenience stores,
small grocery stores (often in tandem with the sale of gas), liquor
stores, chain supermarkets, and chain pharmacies-with youth
access especially concentrated at the first two of these sources.
Concomitantly, it appears that a notably disproportionate share of the
industry's advertising and promotion budget is channeled to those
outlets where underage youths tend to hang out or make purchases,
raising serious questions as to the efficacy of the MSA advertising
limitations in addressing the problem of underage smoking.
What are the principal strategies used in the retail environment?
For analytical purposes, it is possible to identify a set of promotional
policies and a set of pricing strategies. The former include product
placement initiatives, such as self-service displays. Self-service
readily lends itself to shoplifting, as well as providing a particularly
prominent enticement to an on-the-spot purchase attempt.
Apparently, however, self-service is on the decline as a voluntary
matter. Retailers do not like it, precisely because of the pilferage
problem, and at least one of the tobacco manufacturers-Philip
Morris, in fact-has come down against the practice; most likely, as
part of its effort to present a better image.
42
139. See TOM REPORT, supra note 7, at 123.
140. Pierce reports that by 2001 "more than 80 percent of the total advertising and promotion
expenditures by the industry were targeted at incentives to merchants and retail value-added
offers; in short, retail marketing became the dominant strategy." 1OM REPORT, supra note 7, app.
L at 645 (citing John P. Pierce & Elizabeth A. Gilpin, How Did the Master Settlement Agreement
Change Tobacco Industry Expenditures for Cigarette Advertising and Promotions?, 5 HEALTH
PROMOTION PRAC. 84S (Supp. 2004).
141. FED. TRADE COMM'N, REPORT TO CONGRESS FOR 2000 PURSUANT TO THE FEDERAL
CIGARETTE LABELING AND ADVERTISING ACT tbl. 2B (2002).
142. See Helping Reduce Underage Tobacco Use-Philip Morris USA,
http://www.philipmorrisusa.com/en/cms/Responsibility/HelpingReduce Underage-TobaccoUs
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Closely related to self-service as a strategy is a broader set of
height and visibility display considerations, which are in fact the
subject of detailed specification in the manufacturer-retailer
contract-indicating the importance of these marketing
considerations to the tobacco companies. Indeed, contractual
arrangements regarding placement and promotional initiatives are
highly site-specific. In the case of independent stores,
manufacturers' representatives generally make site visits to discuss
these matters, while arrangements with chains are more commonly
conducted through dealings with the central retailing office.
Related to these specifications are the so-called "slotting fees,"
which are industry fees paid to the retailers-in the form of
discounts-linked to advantageous placement and promotion vis-a-
vis competing brands. In addition to product placement itself, these
merchandising strategies address an array of product accessories:
signage (e.g. regarding discount deals), logos, banners, display racks,
and window posters.
The second set of strategies involves pricing policies. So-called
"buy-downs" feature inventory clearance deals, which are time-
constrained discounts. Then, there is the most basic of pricing
strategies: straight volume discounts. Finally, there is an array of
other stratagems, ranging from "buy one, get one free" to coupon-
related inducements. In tandem with the promotional strategies,
these initiatives constitute the industry's current effort to shift
directions, post-MSA, from the traditional mass medium advertising
to a frame of reference that is much closer to the potential buyer's
immediate impulse for gratification.
Paul Bloom discusses an array of options that policy makers
might consider by way of limiting the recent shift in industry
strategy.'43 First, he suggests that government entities could impose
a full ban on slotting fees and trade promotions by tobacco
companies. He cites similar action taken by the Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco, and Firearms in 1995, in an attempt to protect small
wineries and breweries from being ousted from retail shelves due to
high product placement fees paid to large retailers by the major
e/default.aspx (follow "Our Focus Areas - Learn More" hyperlink; then follow "Youth Access
Prevention" hyperlink) (last visited Apr. 5, 2008).
143. See Paul N. Bloom, Role of Slotting Fees and Trade Promotions in Shaping How
Tobacco is Marketed in Retail Stores, 10 TOBACCO CONTROL 340 (2001).
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alcohol producers.' 4  An outright ban could serve to alleviate the
economic pressure felt by retailers to court the big tobacco
manufacturers and thereby become their political allies on issues
related to teen smoking.
Bloom notes, however, that such a ban could have unwanted
effects. As noted above, tobacco companies spend exorbitant
amounts of money every year on such promotional fees-money that
would remain in the pockets of the industry if such payments were
banned.'45 These savings might be reallocated to reductions in
product price, a move that might actually increase youth access to
tobacco products.
Another option might be to regulate retail prices as a means of
preventing retailers from passing on manufacturer-created price
breaks to customers. Bloom refers to a New York regulatory scheme
that prohibits retailers from selling tobacco products below cost (plus
a statutorily imposed markup). 46 He contends that by limiting the
degree to which manufacturers' special offers can actually affect the
market price, states can diminish the stimulation of demand through
trade promotions. On this score, however, in a comparative study of
states with and without retail minimum price controls-half the
states fall into each category-Ellen Feighery found no conclusive
evidence that states with controls had lower prices or lower retailer-
participation rates in these promotional programs.'47
Still other regulatory options, such as elimination of self-service
displays and restrictions on signage-or requirements of antismoking
warning signage-would take direct aim at the retailing
environment. The likely efficacy of these measures varies. One can
question whether more prominent warning signage at the point of
sale would add much, if anything, as a deterrent to consumption
decisions by minors intent on making illegal purchases. Self-service-
display bans, by contrast, may very well have a salutary effect, as
144. Id. at 342-43.
145. Id. at 343.
146. Id.
147. See Ellen C. Feighery et al., How do Minimum Cigarette Price Laws Affect Cigarette
Prices at the Retail Level?, 14 TOBACCO CONTROL 80, 80 (2005). Note, however, that these
programs, with the exception of New York, do not exclude promotional programs from their
minimum price formulas.
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discussed above. But this practice appears to be on the way out in
any event.
When one turns to more restrictive controls on advertising and
promotion in the retail setting, constitutional considerations become
a matter of considerable salience. In Lorillard Tobacco Co. v.
Reilly,'48 the U.S. Supreme Court invalidated Massachusetts
regulations, adopted as a more stringent supplement to the
restrictions on advertising in the MSA, that prohibited outdoor
advertising within a thousand feet of schools (including, in
particular, billboard advertising) and proscribed certain retail sales
practices, such as displaying tobacco product advertising lower than
five feet from the floor of the establishment. The Court left only the
narrowest of the regulations in place-a ban on self-service
displays--on the tailored rationale that the self-service proscription
was not aimed at advertising but at product placement per se (with
ease of underage access the immediate basis for the prohibition).'49
The case may sound a virtual death-knell for regulation of
advertising at point of purchase. Reilly stands on a two-pronged
foundation: first, the commercial speech doctrine as enunciated in
Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission
of New York, 5° and broadly applied in 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode
Island;5' and second, the statutory preemption provision in the
Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of 1966, which, as
interpreted in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.,52 establishes
immunity from tort suits based on claims of failure to adequately
warn for tobacco advertising complying with the labeling
requirements of the statute.
The broad reach of the latter provision is evident in the Reilly
court's assertion that "a distinction between state regulation of the
location as opposed to the content of cigarette advertising has no
foundation in the text of the pre-emption provision."'53 Most of the
constraints on product placement and advertising content in the retail
setting are put in jeopardy by one or the other prong of Reilly, just as
148. 533 U.S. 525 (2001).
149. Id. at 570.
150. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
151. 517 U.S. 484 (1996).
152. 505 U.S. 504 (1992).
153. Reilly, 533 U.S. at 551.
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the five-feet-or-lower proviso is explicitly struck down. At the same
time, however, Reilly would seem to have no bearing on measures
aimed at outlet limitations or other price-related discount restrictions.
It would be possible to address controls on the retail sales
environment from a distinctly different perspective, namely, placing
limits on the number of retail outlets in a particular community. This
strategy has been employed, at times, in the context of retail sales of
alcoholic beverages.'54 Licensing schemes and public monopoly
systems are two methods states have used to limit alcohol retailers in
their jurisdictions. Under a licensing scheme, the state requires
retailers to obtain a license in order to sell alcohol products.
Licenses are issued for a limited period and require reapplication for
renewal. Retailer density can be directly controlled by the licensing
body either by limiting the total number of licenses distributed or by
limiting the density of licenses within geographic areas. Imposing
prohibitive application fees can also serve as an indirect limit on the
number of retailers in an area. A public monopoly system prohibits
the sale of a certain product by private retailers and establishes the
state (or local government) as the sole distributor of the good.
The rationale for these measures is that reducing the number and
density of outlets makes access to the product less convenient and
increases the opportunity cost of using the product (i.e., the time and
resources expended on search costs).' While either of these
approaches may succeed in limiting the supply and availability of
tobacco products, it should be noted that neither approach is targeted
directly at youth access. It would probably be hard to justify outlet
restriction as a primary strategy for reducing youth access to tobacco;
it would be regarded as overkill because of spillover effects to adults
if this were the principal justification. Rather, reduction in youth
access can be regarded as a salutary secondary consequence of policy
154. See Harold D. Holder, Supply Side Approaches to Reducing Underage Drinking: An
Assessment of the Scientific Evidence, in REDUCING UNDERAGE DRINKING: A COLLECTIVE
RESPONSIBILITY 458 (Richard J. Bonnie & Mary Ellen O'Connell, eds., 2004).
155. See George A. Shipman, State Administrative Machinery for Liquor Control, 7 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 600 (1940). In the context of tobacco outlets, an interesting recent variant on
this strategy-aimed at limiting type, rather than number of outlets-is the San Francisco
ordinance banning sales of tobacco products in pharmacies and in-store health clinics, effective
Oct. 2008. See Ann Zimmerman, San Francisco Votes for New Tobacco Rules, WALL ST. J., July
30, 2008, at A2.
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reasons for reducing the number of outlets for the purchase of liquor
across-the-board.
Then the question becomes whether the "inconvenience effects"
(search costs) of outlet restriction can serve as a direct justification,
or strategy, for reducing tobacco consumption across-the-board (i.e.,
not just of youth). As discussed above, the present array of strategies
that impose inconvenience effects do so as a secondary consequence
of achieving other goals-in particular, secondhand smoke zoning-
type restrictions on smoking in public accommodations, which are
justified either on the grounds of health effects or public nuisance
effects on nonsmokers (with inconvenience to smokers and
consequent reduction in smoking serving as a collateral benefit).
These considerations, along with the certain opposition of politically
potent current tobacco sales outlets, suggest the formidable political
barriers that would confront an outlet restriction strategy.
3. Counter-Advertising
The first successful venture in counter-advertising, discussed
above, was the media campaign under the FCC's Fairness Doctrine
waged from 1967-70-perceived to be so successful in fact that the
tobacco industry retreated to other forms of advertising in order to
foreclose public attention to public service health messages on
television. 156 The Fairness Doctrine campaign was not particularly
targeted at the youth population-not surprisingly, perhaps, since
adult smoking at that time was still so pervasive that it was viewed as
a first-order concern in itself. Whatever the case, once broadcast
media advertising was prohibited, counter-advertising as a public
health strategy was abandoned for three decades.'57
Its revitalization was attributable to two discrete public health
initiatives in the 1990s: the turn to the excise tax as an explicit
control measure and the MSA. When California's excise tax
increase of twenty-five cents per pack became effective in 1999, one
proviso was that approximately 20 percent of that revenue was to be
156. See Kenneth E. Warner, The Effects of the Anti-Smoking Campaign on Cigarette
Consumption, 67 AM. J. PUBLIC HEALTH 645 (1977); see also, 1OM REPORT, supra note 7, at
223.
157. See 1OM REPORT, supra note 7, at 223. The ban on broadcast advertising meant that
counter-advertising time was no longer required of the broadcast media.
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allocated to media counter-advertising.'58  And the subsequent
campaign, soon followed by Massachusetts, focused heavily on ads
aimed at the youth population. In both states, impact studies
indicated that smoking, and in particular youth smoking, was
reduced in some measure as a consequence of exposure to the ads.'59
Nonetheless, the campaigns foundered after a short run, victims of
the states' thirst for revenue enhancement in a period of budgetary
crises.
Just as the California and Massachusetts excise tax-based
campaigns played out, however, a new source of funding filled the
breach: state revenues realized under the MSA. These revenues were
partially earmarked by Florida, in a widely-publicized effort, at
counter-advertising explicitly aimed at the youth population. 6 ' At
roughly the same time, a national campaign by the Legacy
Foundation, again relying on MSA funding and modeled on the
Florida youth-centered initiatives, was undertaken. 6' Both of these
ventures were also the subject of impact studies, and once again the
findings suggested positive public health returns.'62 After a short run,
however, the funding again dried up.'63
The question is whether these experiences suggest a promising
pathway at this point for further success in reducing youth smoking.
In my view, the answer is a qualified yes. Obviously, the threshold
issue is to determine what accounted for the success of these
campaigns and whether it can be replicated. The theme that most
clearly emerges is that getting across the message in vivid, indeed
stark terms, that the industry was cynically manipulating the youth
population through indifference to the deadly character of tobacco
158. IOM REPORT, supra note 7, at 224.
159. On Massachusetts, see Lois Biener et al., Impact of the Massachusetts Tobacco Control
Programme: Population Based Trend Analysis, 321 BRIT. MED. J. 351, 353 (2000) (finding that
"[o]ur analysis of the Massachusetts tobacco control programme shows that a strongly
implemented, comprehensive control programme can reduce a population's health risks from
tobacco use."). Another Biener article discussing the same study suggests that youths that were
exposed to these counter-ads on television were more likely to have an accurate perception of the
prevalence of smoking in the youth population and notes that perceived prevalence of smoking is
a factor in youths deciding to take up smoking themselves. See Michael Siegel & Lois Biener,
The Impact of an Antismoking Media Campaign on Progression to Established Smoking: Results
of a Longitudinal Youth Study, 90 AM. J. OF PUB. HEALTH 380 (2000).
160. See IOM REPORT, supra note 7, at 228.
161. See id. at 229.
162. See id. at 229-31.
163. See BRANDT, supra note 1, at 436.
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use and reliance on deceitful conduct, promoted a sense of anger that
translated into reduced smoking activity.
Tobacco use remains just as deadly as ever, of course, and the
industry continues to merchandise the same product. But two
questions seem critical with the passage of a few years since these
campaigns realized a measure of success. The first is whether
villainizing the industry retains the same salience as the egregious
conduct highlighted in revelations more than a decade ago recede
into the past. At some point, the internal industry documents that
yielded the MSA become largely of historical interest, and then the
somewhat more abstract characterization of industry greed and
cynicism based exclusively on marketing a highly risky product
becomes the centerpiece of a rogue industry campaign. Whether this
leads to lower impact on the youth population is an empirical
question, and I am uncertain about the answer. It is of course
possible to shift gears to another strategy, based more centrally on
peer-delivered messages that smoking isn't "cool;" past efforts to
take this tack appear to have met with some success."
The second question can be viewed as more foundational. As
youth culture centers far more on the Internet and computer-based
activities than was true even a few short years ago, one can ask
whether broadcast media-based campaigns would veer increasingly
wide of the target audience. Again, this is an empirical question,
centered on how youth of various demographic characteristics use
their leisure time. It suggests another reason for caution on whether
the strategies that worked (to some extent) in the past, are relevant
for the future.
4. Taxation and Complementary Strategies:
An Endgame for Now
As the earlier section on excise taxes suggested, there are robust
data indicating moderately high consumer sensitivity to tax
increases.'65 A similar consensus exists that the elasticity of demand
in the youth population is, if anything, even higher.'66 Since
164. See IOM REPORT, supra note 7, at 227-29; see also Lois Biener, Anti-Tobacco
Advertisements by Massachusetts and Philip Morris: What Teenagers Think, 11 TOBACCO
CONTROL ii43 (Supp. II 2002).
165. See supra Part I.C.
166. See IOM REPORT, supra note 7, at 183.
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underage smokers are an especially cash-starved population, this
comes as no particular surprise. Moreover, it is almost certainly the
case that evasive measures such as lower-cost internet purchases on
credit cards and cross-boundary shopping via travel mobility are less
open to the youth population.
A recent study of teenage smoking rates in New York City
confirms in dramatic fashion the research findings. 6 7 The 2007 New
York City Youth Risk Behavior Survey reported that teenage
smoking declined by 20 percent between 2005 and 2007 and by more
than half over the past six years-from 18 percent smoking in the
city's teenage population in 2001 to 8.5 percent in 2007.68 By
contrast, nationwide data from 2005 indicate a 23 percent rate of
smoking in the same age cohort, reflecting a slight increase from
2003 to 2005.169 While there are no econometric studies conclusively
linking this dramatic decrease in New York City to excise tax rates,
city health officials pointed out that there was a steady rise in city
and state tobacco taxes during this period, adding three dollars to the
price of each pack and cumulating in a retail price of seven dollars
and above. 170
Putting aside for a moment the synergistic effects of
complementary control strategies, how is one to weigh the apparently
powerful impact of the excise tax on teenage smoking against the
regressive spillover effects on the lower-income adult smoking
167. Youth Risk Behavior Survey: Overview, http://www.nyc.gov/html/doh/html/episrv/
episrv-youthriskbehavior.shtml (last visited Oct. 23, 2008); Youth Risk Behavior Survey:
Methodology, http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/PDF/rr/rr5312.pdf (last visited Oct. 23, 2008).
168. Id. The definition of smokers was based on the percentage of students who smoked
cigarettes on one or more of the past thirty days.
169. See IOM REPORT, supra note 7, at 53. Nationwide data for 2006 indicates the 23 percent
figure remains steady; see Centers for Disease Control, Fact Sheet: Youth and Tobacco Uses:
Current Estimates (Dec. 2006), available at http://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/data-statistics/
fact sheets/youth data/youth tobacco.htm.
170. See Thomas R. Frieden, Adult Tobacco Use Levels after Intensive Tobacco Control
Measures: New York City, 2002-2003, 95 AM. J. OF PUB. HEALTH 1016 (2005) ("[A]n increase in
the city's cigarette tax (from $0.08 to $1.50 per pack), became effective on July 2, 2002. New
York State had already increased its tax from $1.11 to $1.50 per pack on April 1, 2002. Together,
the state and city tax increases raised the cost of a pack of cigarettes by approximately 32 percent,
to a retail price of approximately $6.85.") On May 9, 2008, a random check at a Duane Reade
drugstore in New York City revealed that a pack of Marlboros cost $7.03; a mid-March check at a
Manhattan subway station kiosk revealed a price of $7.50 per pack. Still another New York state
tax increase, of $1.25 per pack, became effective June 3, 2008, raising the combined city and state
taxes to $4.25 per pack-the highest in the nation at this point. See Stephanie Saul, Government
Gets Hooked on Tobacco Tax Billions, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31, 2008, at Week in Review 3.
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population? Obviously, there is no need for reconciliation if one
views this coercive pressure on the adult population as a positive
health benefit that overrides concerns about individual autonomy. 7'
It is also possible to trump the autonomy concern by giving great
weight to the addictive character of smoking. These are points I
raised but did not pursue in the earlier section on the taxation
strategy. 72 In my view, the relative deficiencies of other strategies
for reducing teenage smoking, combined with the gateway effect of
youth tobacco use to an addicted adult population if only limited
regulatory measures are taken, overrides (even if it does not put to
rest) the fairness concern about the spillover impact on a
socioeconomically disadvantaged adult smoking population. In the
end, a relatively steady 20 percent smoking rate in the teenage
population simply seems too heavy a public health burden to tolerate
indefinitely.
It is critical to note, as well, that the synergistic effects of
regulatory resort to excise tax increases appear to be quite
substantial, if the New York experience is examined closely.1
73
Along with proactive taxation, New York maintains an active media
campaign against teenage smoking, featuring ads that vividly
dramatize the health impacts of tobacco use."' At the same time, the
city has a particularly aggressive sales-to-minors enforcement
program, relying on inspections that employ teenagers in undercover
purchase efforts backed by fines and prospective license
revocations.'75 This latter regulatory initiative has been strikingly
successful: the Department of Consumer Affairs, which runs the
program, reported an 89 percent compliance rate at the retail store
level in 2007.176 Even if the precise contribution of each of these
171. See 1OM REPORT, supra note 7, at 187, which takes this position.
172. See supra Part I.C.
173. See Anthony Ramirez, Teenagers in the City Smoke Less, Report Finds, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 3, 2008, at B3.
174. Id.; see also Thomas Frieden & Michael Bloomberg, How to Prevent 100 Million Deaths
from Tobacco, 369 LANCET 1758 (2007). For an earlier description of the adult program, see
Thomas Frieden et al., supra note, 170.
175. See Ramirez, supra note 173.
176. Id. For penalty schedule, see New York Adolescent Tobacco Use Prevention Act
(ATUPA). A summary can be found in, Youth and Tobacco: They Buy, You Pay (Fact Sheet).
Links to the language of the ATUPA law can be found at
http://www.nyc.gov/html/doh/html/smoke/smoke2-egal.shtml.
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strategies has not been carefully measured, in tandem they appear to
be achieving impressive results.
It would be risky to conclude that the New York experience-
even assuming it has staying power-can simply be picked up and
transported elsewhere without reference to the character of local
communities. But a model need not be a precise blueprint if it is
highly suggestive of an approach warranting serious consideration.
My assessment is that the priorities reflected in the current New
York multi-pronged effort constitute the best bet for achieving
further substantial reductions in youth smoking at this particular
juncture in the road to controlling tobacco use.
